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Biederman" Subject: [PATCH 4.19 148/205] mount: Dont allow copying MNT_UNBINDABLE|MNT_LOCKED mounts Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 17:27:35 +0100 Message-Id: <20181119162638.453513392@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20181119162616.586062722@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181119162616.586062722@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Eric W. Biederman commit df7342b240185d58d3d9665c0bbf0a0f5570ec29 upstream. Jonathan Calmels from NVIDIA reported that he's able to bypass the mount visibility security check in place in the Linux kernel by using a combination of the unbindable property along with the private mount propagation option to allow a unprivileged user to see a path which was purposefully hidden by the root user. Reproducer: # Hide a path to all users using a tmpfs root@castiana:~# mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /sys/devices/ root@castiana:~# # As an unprivileged user, unshare user namespace and mount namespace stgraber@castiana:~$ unshare -U -m -r # Confirm the path is still not accessible root@castiana:~# ls /sys/devices/ # Make /sys recursively unbindable and private root@castiana:~# mount --make-runbindable /sys root@castiana:~# mount --make-private /sys # Recursively bind-mount the rest of /sys over to /mnnt root@castiana:~# mount --rbind /sys/ /mnt # Access our hidden /sys/device as an unprivileged user root@castiana:~# ls /mnt/devices/ breakpoint cpu cstate_core cstate_pkg i915 intel_pt isa kprobe LNXSYSTM:00 msr pci0000:00 platform pnp0 power software system tracepoint uncore_arb uncore_cbox_0 uncore_cbox_1 uprobe virtual Solve this by teaching copy_tree to fail if a mount turns out to be both unbindable and locked. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5ff9d8a65ce8 ("vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users") Reported-by: Jonathan Calmels Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/namespace.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1734,8 +1734,14 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mn for (s = r; s; s = next_mnt(s, r)) { if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) { - s = skip_mnt_tree(s); - continue; + if (s->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) { + /* Both unbindable and locked. */ + q = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + goto out; + } else { + s = skip_mnt_tree(s); + continue; + } } if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) && is_mnt_ns_file(s->mnt.mnt_root)) {