Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:27:01 +0100 (CET)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To:     Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        "stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: STIBP by default.. Revert?
In-Reply-To: <51127fd4-5dcc-b2b9-4873-72098d2a77d9@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811201623300.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
References: <CAHk-=wg-9FUGU=grF4gKDq1sm1m39Jbs3A_iyLbSSntU47ncwg@mail.gmail.com> <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1811182222230.21108@cbobk.fhfr.pm> <CAHk-=whH2daKsZTqVPb-G9mJ1g15XMse7j-9YqN+yBYk7M9=Dw@mail.gmail.com> <51127fd4-5dcc-b2b9-4873-72098d2a77d9@linux.intel.com>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LSU 202 2017-01-01)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Mon, 19 Nov 2018, Arjan van de Ven wrote:

> In the documentation, AMD officially recommends against this by default, 
> and I can speak for Intel that our position is that as well: this really 
> must not be on by default.

Thanks for pointing to the AMD doc, it's indeed clearly stated there.

Is there any chance this could perhaps be added to Intel documentation as 
well, so that we avoid cases like this in the future?

The revision 3.0 of Intel doc from may 2018 [1] I am always looking into 
doesn't say anything discouraging about STIBP to me.

[1] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf?_gclid=5b78f4d130faf8.22277271-5b78f4d130fb70.17467890&_utm_source=xakep&_utm_campaign=mention177777&_utm_medium=inline&_utm_content=lnk223716354570

Thanks,

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs