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From:   Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
To:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC:     <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, <linux_dti@icloud.com>,
        <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 08/10] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading
Date:   Tue, 20 Nov 2018 12:35:43 -0800
Message-ID: <20181120203545.34928-9-namit@vmware.com>
In-Reply-To: <20181120203545.34928-1-namit@vmware.com>
References: <20181120203545.34928-1-namit@vmware.com>
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When modules and BPF filters are loaded, there is a time window in
which some memory is both writable and executable. An attacker that has
already found another vulnerability (e.g., a dangling pointer) might be
able to exploit this behavior to overwrite kernel code. This patch
prevents having writable executable PTEs in this stage.

In addition, avoiding having R+X mappings can also slightly simplify the
patching of modules code on initialization (e.g., by alternatives and
static-key), as would be done in the next patch.

To avoid having W+X mappings, set them initially as RW (NX) and after
they are set as RO set them as X as well. Setting them as executable is
done as a separate step to avoid one core in which the old PTE is cached
(hence writable), and another which sees the updated PTE (executable),
which would break the W^X protection.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/module.c      |  2 +-
 include/linux/filter.h        |  6 ++++++
 kernel/module.c               | 10 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 8fc4685f3117..18415e3b6000 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -667,15 +667,29 @@ void __init alternative_instructions(void)
  * handlers seeing an inconsistent instruction while you patch.
  */
 void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
-					      size_t len)
+				       size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-	memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-	sync_core();
-	/* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
-	   that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs. */
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX) &&
+	    is_module_text_address((unsigned long)addr)) {
+		/*
+		 * Modules text is marked initially as non-executable, so the
+		 * code cannot be running and speculative code-fetches are
+		 * prevented. We can just change the code.
+		 */
+		memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
+	} else {
+		local_irq_save(flags);
+		memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
+		local_irq_restore(flags);
+		sync_core();
+
+		/*
+		 * Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
+		 * that causes hangs on some VIA CPUs.
+		 */
+	}
 	return addr;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
index b052e883dd8c..cfa3106faee4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
 	p = __vmalloc_node_range(size, MODULE_ALIGN,
 				    MODULES_VADDR + get_module_load_offset(),
 				    MODULES_END, GFP_KERNEL,
-				    PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, 0, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+				    PAGE_KERNEL, 0, NUMA_NO_NODE,
 				    __builtin_return_address(0));
 	if (p && (kasan_module_alloc(p, size) < 0)) {
 		vfree(p);
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index de629b706d1d..ee9ae03c5f56 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -704,7 +704,13 @@ static inline void bpf_prog_unlock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 
 static inline void bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Perform mapping changes in two stages to avoid opening a time-window
+	 * in which a PTE is cached in any TLB as writable, but marked as
+	 * executable in the memory-resident mappings (e.g., page-tables).
+	 */
 	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)hdr, hdr->pages);
+	set_memory_x((unsigned long)hdr, hdr->pages);
 }
 
 static inline void bpf_jit_binary_unlock_ro(struct bpf_binary_header *hdr)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 49a405891587..7cb207249437 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1946,9 +1946,19 @@ void module_enable_ro(const struct module *mod, bool after_init)
 	if (!rodata_enabled)
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * Perform mapping changes in two stages to avoid opening a time-window
+	 * in which a PTE is cached in any TLB as writable, but marked as
+	 * executable in the memory-resident mappings (e.g., page-tables).
+	 */
 	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_ro);
+	frob_text(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_x);
+
 	frob_rodata(&mod->core_layout, set_memory_ro);
+
 	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_ro);
+	frob_text(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_x);
+
 	frob_rodata(&mod->init_layout, set_memory_ro);
 
 	if (after_init)
-- 
2.17.1