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Date:   Thu, 22 Nov 2018 18:52:29 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, dave.hansen@intel.com,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
        "Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
        "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan@linux.intel.com>, jcm@redhat.com,
        longman9394@gmail.com, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        david.c.stewart@intel.com, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment
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On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 11:30:04AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> But it does describe its purpose, especially in relation to the
> 'spectre_v2=' option.

Sure, but the thing I'm proposing

spectre_v2_task_isol=

describes it more precisely, IMHO. :)

I.e., "enable/disable spectre v2 task isolation".

> Previously 'spectre_v2=' might have been more appropriately named
> 'spectre_v2_kernel=' because it only protected the kernel from Spectre
> v2 attacks.  Now with these new patches, 'spectre_v2=on' will protect
> the entire system.

Hmmm, crazy idea: can we extend the options of spectre_v2= nstead?

spectre_v2=user_isolation,...
spectre_v2=kernel,...
spectre_v2=task_isolation,...

and so on?

This way we can do a couple of option switches in one go.

Hmmm?

> Now off to eat a giant turkey.

Try not to fall into a turkey coma. :-P

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.