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Date:   Sat, 24 Nov 2018 08:15:21 -0800
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>, shay.katz-zamir@intel.com,
        haitao.huang@linux.intel.com,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, mark.shanahan@intel.com,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>, andy@infradead.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver
Message-ID: <20181124161521.GB30310@linux.intel.com>
References: <20181116010412.23967-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 05:15:08AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> Malware would not necessarily need the Intel attestation service.
> Once access to the PROVISION bit is available, malware teams could
> simply build their own attestation service.

AFAIK not possible as they wouldn't have access to the root provisioning
key. Can be confirmed from the SDM's key derivation table (41-56).

/Jarkko