Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp5613504imu; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 03:01:38 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/UwHrN51GWVu/8NihKjwwIHE98HN+7S+r7ADPpN8kSfYk3fUm4R23xwm6+y6GoLUa6SqQ49 X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:22f:: with SMTP id 44mr25419143plc.137.1543230098735; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 03:01:38 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1543230098; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=zK54AK3o8HqH6vs9CkFkyIhBaVtpVeQWklVBi5qWATa2tGD3o6AXO6ekGLVF89FAUv xIOfjNBU+7MyXE5AzO3sNIMMmlMVwBwUCJPlyZiJu53J4lVovudQ6qXnUtm4pIoS6WXr 0LAuFES+a8N6ixMt1nfq0Mgz+W6fz+TBjrX+o6dV93ldHAAdmSgZJm6uVIdfyFzcQcRg CD+BZK6FuNYhwrdQvvNHnOGw9qbwh6NuareEcd5UOH1Bo1ZKIf+L4Qdf7nIoq3vo+ake e50ijJSityqL0g/rqSz4kGCvAj68k6sbgpq3Pm153eiu6c9AkG5qfqmqySF+h0da2Wgq hlAw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=XK1xTZAeQ4C1YwaBd8+J1neOLJnnhRfEh6LejZgdk1o=; b=VpYY3E+gZroZlbw9nMEljXWMm8jqN0H45tKAiu6QHdTLknpysMXhSkhOdgwxsWkPwB UgmCltjh3EjCMHrKwK4PVsRNjYIsdb919GIKyo9QerRS3iUag45BhjpZGrQvMa80VMsE AJuetB8KUJilr1qxhH438bE8/AtcdqozCurVtRSvDYX948RGCCXIuTEU5lo0U1Ya7llA ovZIKk7A0F/VvxlyItLXJJqwc2Y/8QMvajSdl8NVkGRdGRH1Cd9DvsWPE9XoOcro6MDy bi7RjEwQ7ggfkbsOushJisZxGoZZOW3lUBKd/Gz0FyzXZbNH3+7NeX1SRuML1ZzaZ3Eo +wxA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b="yh/Ik3b0"; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h14si53554040pgd.189.2018.11.26.03.01.18; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 03:01:38 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b="yh/Ik3b0"; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729344AbeKZVwc (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 26 Nov 2018 16:52:32 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:34034 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727875AbeKZVwb (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Nov 2018 16:52:31 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5048D21104; Mon, 26 Nov 2018 10:58:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1543229926; bh=wN5S2M3AcFqsf1TBGlyzDxns7vaVQXEHLs3A9ghF3Yk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yh/Ik3b0QhkEG4BDTn54fWP5JByJ+SvaysU94RxjDJcIW54kNSIV9SvYxwzjVw8LL 6G8uVtg/CqzNCSIXAvS6wLgeACGl/GLTQyK2ztbBuMxSuUJxENh58nL8QV5wN1BKZ8 9cv/tV1n+LDlh2t/UKGMlZ7W3RRsja7ydzT83Qnw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" Subject: [PATCH 4.9 42/46] drivers/misc/sgi-gru: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 11:51:31 +0100 Message-Id: <20181126105050.061589529@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.2 In-Reply-To: <20181126105045.447291262@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181126105045.447291262@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit fee05f455ceb5c670cbe48e2f9454ebc4a388554 upstream. req.gid can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: vers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c:200 gru_dump_chiplet_request() warn: potential spectre issue 'gru_base' [w] Fix this by sanitizing req.gid before calling macro GID_TO_GRU, which uses it to index gru_base. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c +++ b/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ #include #include #include + +#include + #include "gru.h" #include "grutables.h" #include "gruhandles.h" @@ -196,6 +199,7 @@ int gru_dump_chiplet_request(unsigned lo /* Currently, only dump by gid is implemented */ if (req.gid >= gru_max_gids) return -EINVAL; + req.gid = array_index_nospec(req.gid, gru_max_gids); gru = GID_TO_GRU(req.gid); ubuf = req.buf;