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Date:   Mon, 26 Nov 2018 14:16:49 -0800
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>, shay.katz-zamir@intel.com,
        haitao.huang@linux.intel.com,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, mark.shanahan@intel.com,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver
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On Mon, Nov 26, 2018 at 05:00:39AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> We will be interested in your comments as to why the proposal is
> insufficient in the real world of FLC.
> 
> I believe the proposed architecture can be defended as being effective
> in the real world, as it allows the root user to use cryptographic
> protections of access to the PROVISION bit and to enclave execution in
> general.  On FLC that is the strongest guarantee that can be
> delivered.
> 
> When we speak of 'unauthorized' users I believe we are speaking in the
> parlance of discretionary access controls which has a much wider TCB
> scope then the cryptographic model we are proposing.  The model we
> propose allows the platform owner (root) to effectively implement the
> same level of security over the PROVISION bit that current locked
> platforms have, in a free and open fashion of course.
> 
> We can certainly attempt to explain our position further.

I think kernel controlled provision would in all cases lower the
mitigations of thread scenarios (at least what you've presented so far)
assuming that a compromissed kernel could be detected fairly quickly,
wouldn't it?

Even without SGX, having a compromissed kernel, you can anyhow stealth
your malware in many ways.

/Jarkko