Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp4227283imu; Fri, 30 Nov 2018 13:14:46 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/VtenjJ3kHQUX3vnsWGUx6VBJAn2JNd+0S4JqNecVI88fN1SLN9r6jXpFsttnk9a9yhTTht X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:a5ca:: with SMTP id t10mr7141338plq.139.1543612486190; Fri, 30 Nov 2018 13:14:46 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1543612486; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Q6ZnnDb3m6JsWS+dPrFjJk+0wzqbXVULRNKDwvDyXHiP9ef3yqUuGbj1125G+a5CUg LcvAoyEU2QLo2Py5w3bUP0m+8+SFlu9NARhwTe0Nh6xYLGEW20k2pAX8Qm6hkeFT+McN U5Czy8Uof6IxoAOZ126/v4a71P5FW8W11eDBpCvEX69JrV5rPqFbLySnZ36bMoS9KV7+ 1P/2yfs6jyWO83MWBZgYX/W0nZBiSMDRTq0jLr9jHXy4X/NWHiM8I97tw/HDaXszfOQM P3XjDGjQrVqSCqZiyEzAnTI+oSIyRzi0c1LQ/CiGvHmIptVeuFBSEcQ8FBpXRQyVOZjC +0BA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:mime-version:user-agent:references :message-id:in-reply-to:subject:cc:to:from:date; bh=etp5qsOc1cJt0uYPpJMvH4Xh2olZV6Er77xvDZQSqGk=; b=iUm8AeiWFTzkzNZlefZaU6XYOenvNZSsgSiAoJgyOFSOlif+ySxtQ90SdnB2OQmDAU W3ib4vJzb0KASt0pV7FeBcqPHY9MAF2ao4NxWZSjkRYoMrnkBZ1p+fHUXiGigV25ERDC 21d2PlasmCeeh/gAIsM6NNIechTVHLQ537JOvRKoyibXbbkA+i2QQAIfx53lyrgnsAW0 68mvr02GGUnkGtLZmmR7K7Ri+gXHUr2dmhfbOWCohswonNdRRR7qN0kDdmF50VJxOqjs wm4SJFZZDP4gqiWqc6Fy2ZRwg2X5x32yMsyZLgxNR7/yheGreVWEBmvPb32VBc1XaH26 +q+g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h9si5890580pgb.319.2018.11.30.13.14.31; Fri, 30 Nov 2018 13:14:46 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726693AbeLAIYX (ORCPT + 99 others); Sat, 1 Dec 2018 03:24:23 -0500 Received: from mx2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:44948 "EHLO mx1.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725749AbeLAIYW (ORCPT ); Sat, 1 Dec 2018 03:24:22 -0500 X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay1.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABE8AAC89; Fri, 30 Nov 2018 21:13:45 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 22:13:42 +0100 (CET) From: Jiri Kosina To: Andy Lutomirski cc: Steven Rostedt , Linus Torvalds , Josh Poimboeuf , Peter Zijlstra , X86 ML , LKML , Ard Biesheuvel , Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner , Masami Hiramatsu , Jason Baron , David Laight , Borislav Petkov , julia@ni.com, jeyu@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] x86/static_call: Add inline static call implementation for x86-64 In-Reply-To: Message-ID: References: <20181129124404.2fe55dd0@gandalf.local.home> <20181129125857.75c55b96@gandalf.local.home> <20181129134725.6d86ade6@gandalf.local.home> <20181129202452.56f4j2wdct6qbaqo@treble> <20181130183917.hxmti5josgq4clti@treble> <20181130152852.456ce379@gandalf.local.home> User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LSU 202 2017-01-01) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 30 Nov 2018, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > According to the SDM, you can program the APIC ICR to request an SMI. > It's not remotely clear to me what will happen if we do this. I think one of the known reliable ways to trigger SMI is to write 0x0 to the SMI command I/O port (0xb2). > For all I know, the SMI handler will explode and the computer will catch > fire. Ha, therefore noone can't claim any more that SMIs are always harmful :) -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs