Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp8130266imu; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 03:31:59 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/WBH8gnrnauPBkLLyNvZ/Uv8B+4tC/anydE6YoIm4u2c0FIpd3VqO7y34B4xRRYLEj6LhY+ X-Received: by 2002:a63:f141:: with SMTP id o1mr15404543pgk.134.1543923119815; Tue, 04 Dec 2018 03:31:59 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1543923119; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=fk6wDh67dQrogbToALkkUQ5cgwopMdk4e9Zi//w5vaWr2MpIPsD+w/qKVlOqpTw81z bQ2h903+3AneXYuzWoWrbukIaybqXIP/O9c13L8aliEBkqr+UxaS9kXLZ18Je7Xt+dmM xGq+teyD0q1+2bmaMFbFa1kTKWW3XItViYOPg54CnfFrWcY5BUPal14hVaAI0YtH1q78 btp59m+jStrHUxo0S0GNjEolBBh+iJatTQrEcn08fhvExK+OCRBGQ8XWSDXfygabFICU vg7iCQa1dS0nbRiyILtrDbBHs69rbOsHUb02b5+wcUShtcz1DYr3ykoBVTuDNKv7Lxzg sebg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=Fk/1Zdhh/Sdkf6ethar6eBXLJf/OK322Cu5ZAiDH/eQ=; b=qNipwtWWNfZywLqWMjrVuPCXP4FFBENQ31KGN1zYMj0azXCxNtpYKeMSk9Z4zQyYt7 HzcXeHW5uWE7ct7feISMyx1UOAZwNzzKlicJqAjmpmdjoeaKKDrKd2XwtOgj1dOkW5U7 dAGqwtdH2wvN4EeOmCnJqChZ9u0l+QNLG2VOHaeDeedi7fwVK4evq/xZSFx7zcnnez/v kCi1uqcvJk8vf4eYOp7dvd7n8R0+Hwl54LXNp78+HvR3glm82mVqLaHkP0olxF/Rv46O zyLtU0/NlWIN6c1XrvhMeTmWziWwOhn9OvML9lcK9p8mUhP92LdL5n981laNYxIfRX1G HY+Q== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=W3IO0BBD; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id z14si14048152pgu.525.2018.12.04.03.31.44; Tue, 04 Dec 2018 03:31:59 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=W3IO0BBD; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726787AbeLDK5i (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 05:57:38 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:41602 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726356AbeLDK5g (ORCPT ); Tue, 4 Dec 2018 05:57:36 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E6DDC214E0; Tue, 4 Dec 2018 10:57:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1543921054; bh=FDpi0MJiAFOsB8KzzN68LyvvOFgpI2gyRsQxPQtUk3c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=W3IO0BBD/EffGMuHllrbUYhJuufuQj4grMOButYtlHhLtJ5loDRjGpczA/QV3CtVx 5GtgTYi6UqJIHduJzC3+xoUmxcICTWAoeUmegQLkDeNXmNZpkQE8m55ZXysM8Ribdc V6SvvravRb/ir3bpnVRGqumV6UUKXSCLzhIBFXtM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrea Arcangeli , Mike Rapoport , Hugh Dickins , Jann Horn , "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" , Mike Kravetz , Peter Xu , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 4.19 062/139] userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 11:49:03 +0100 Message-Id: <20181204103652.556966768@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.2 In-Reply-To: <20181204103649.950154335@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181204103649.950154335@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Andrea Arcangeli commit 29ec90660d68bbdd69507c1c8b4e33aa299278b1 upstream. After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY. The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless it's a MAP_PRIVATE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins Reported-by: Jann Horn Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support") Cc: Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Peter Xu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 ++++++--------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -1361,6 +1361,19 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct u ret = -EINVAL; if (!vma_can_userfault(cur)) goto out_unlock; + + /* + * UFFDIO_COPY will fill file holes even without + * PROT_WRITE. This check enforces that if this is a + * MAP_SHARED, the process has write permission to the backing + * file. If VM_MAYWRITE is set it also enforces that on a + * MAP_SHARED vma: there is no F_WRITE_SEAL and no further + * F_WRITE_SEAL can be taken until the vma is destroyed. + */ + ret = -EPERM; + if (unlikely(!(cur->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE))) + goto out_unlock; + /* * If this vma contains ending address, and huge pages * check alignment. @@ -1406,6 +1419,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct u BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma)); BUG_ON(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx && vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx); + WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)); /* * Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this @@ -1552,6 +1566,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct cond_resched(); BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma)); + WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)); /* * Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -205,8 +205,9 @@ retry: if (!dst_vma || !is_vm_hugetlb_page(dst_vma)) goto out_unlock; /* - * Only allow __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb on userfaultfd - * registered ranges. + * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is + * required to enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at + * uffd registration time. */ if (!dst_vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx) goto out_unlock; @@ -449,13 +450,9 @@ retry: if (!dst_vma) goto out_unlock; /* - * Be strict and only allow __mcopy_atomic on userfaultfd - * registered ranges to prevent userland errors going - * unnoticed. As far as the VM consistency is concerned, it - * would be perfectly safe to remove this check, but there's - * no useful usage for __mcopy_atomic ouside of userfaultfd - * registered ranges. This is after all why these are ioctls - * belonging to the userfaultfd and not syscalls. + * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is required to + * enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at uffd registration + * time. */ if (!dst_vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx) goto out_unlock;