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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 4si405931pfg.280.2018.12.06.06.54.55; Thu, 06 Dec 2018 06:55:11 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=u8O4MLXu; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731188AbeLFOqD (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 6 Dec 2018 09:46:03 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:50736 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729878AbeLFOqA (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Dec 2018 09:46:00 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5ABCE214DB; Thu, 6 Dec 2018 14:45:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1544107559; bh=xJ04k7vH5tlOLEYa1HTQPi3sIe5pgdsb7/A0h3nF3rk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=u8O4MLXuqFerBTBICnLr2qzLDZk7mIxpviRItHtjZJ56OXfupay6lJaxtZV/Mw+lE BTkGQ8ao6+iUre6AN3JpKy8Xh43BZ71OhqZMEVgfjnIAyzk7qFiCGF1fPUoDGTWDwS l3XBGKsdd7GGajKubdvWNlRGvHts58ifjDoY4w8E= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Ilya Dryomov , Sage Weil , Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 4.9 053/101] libceph: factor out encrypt_authorizer() Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2018 15:38:52 +0100 Message-Id: <20181206143014.617154520@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.2 In-Reply-To: <20181206143011.174892052@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20181206143011.174892052@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Ilya Dryomov commit 149cac4a50b0b4081b38b2f38de6ef71c27eaa85 upstream. Will be used for encrypting both the initial and updated authorizers. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) --- a/net/ceph/auth_x.c +++ b/net/ceph/auth_x.c @@ -286,6 +286,38 @@ bad: return -EINVAL; } +/* + * Encode and encrypt the second part (ceph_x_authorize_b) of the + * authorizer. The first part (ceph_x_authorize_a) should already be + * encoded. + */ +static int encrypt_authorizer(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au) +{ + struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a; + struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b; + void *p, *end; + int ret; + + msg_a = au->buf->vec.iov_base; + WARN_ON(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id != cpu_to_le64(au->secret_id)); + p = (void *)(msg_a + 1) + le32_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.blob_len); + end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len; + + msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(); + msg_b->struct_v = 1; + msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce); + + ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + p += ret; + WARN_ON(p > end); + au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base; + + return 0; +} + static void ceph_x_authorizer_cleanup(struct ceph_x_authorizer *au) { ceph_crypto_key_destroy(&au->session_key); @@ -302,7 +334,6 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc int maxlen; struct ceph_x_authorize_a *msg_a; struct ceph_x_authorize_b *msg_b; - void *p, *end; int ret; int ticket_blob_len = (th->ticket_blob ? th->ticket_blob->vec.iov_len : 0); @@ -346,21 +377,13 @@ static int ceph_x_build_authorizer(struc dout(" th %p secret_id %lld %lld\n", th, th->secret_id, le64_to_cpu(msg_a->ticket_blob.secret_id)); - p = msg_a + 1; - p += ticket_blob_len; - end = au->buf->vec.iov_base + au->buf->vec.iov_len; - - msg_b = p + ceph_x_encrypt_offset(); - msg_b->struct_v = 1; get_random_bytes(&au->nonce, sizeof(au->nonce)); - msg_b->nonce = cpu_to_le64(au->nonce); - ret = ceph_x_encrypt(&au->session_key, p, end - p, sizeof(*msg_b)); - if (ret < 0) + ret = encrypt_authorizer(au); + if (ret) { + pr_err("failed to encrypt authorizer: %d", ret); goto out_au; + } - p += ret; - WARN_ON(p > end); - au->buf->vec.iov_len = p - au->buf->vec.iov_base; dout(" built authorizer nonce %llx len %d\n", au->nonce, (int)au->buf->vec.iov_len); return 0;