Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp11261040imu; Thu, 6 Dec 2018 14:23:36 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AFSGD/UI5/Bvm3AfEZHh3A7GB6JQqdKRWQUdN9x3FF7PmlsCEZXQMX36hl6tdkRjz02OcW4804tL X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:29ab:: with SMTP id h40mr29751153plb.238.1544135016800; Thu, 06 Dec 2018 14:23:36 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1544135016; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=LvO4Jg5mr7dLUiWK5+KqJXNpz8RzdQ04Fx1K1wqjOeAU6D2CLaeHGXy2dOvboQZMLF M8HpcPizs/BKt9iCeOJQiRMEx9CCvDigp0dMtjB4FDj2Bw+Hr+PAyjaF/Xb4qJccgskc 7h3hW0kSHiNZVZGb2vYPBpW+6Ns7XV/pVqdMCxKcO1P93L6Vi8cvrv6O+3lHRJ53jXzc lA1qj6ga1q/GaA+Y5DPrCqKf9xV5ExTlEVXdIovqV1hWXNxpQvWlQ8rwT2UZartfOoqp 9+kAOrYxEYend///ubizv/gZ7WM5nfGFi3wd5b9+KEowz6HLWy+uhBHd1KKTMnjlyTRD zVqQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:mime-version:user-agent:message-id :in-reply-to:date:references:subject:cc:to:from; bh=weHoPVKLO2Xgf2z/FWH3JLBujQEYCoY2RbCcB8Lu/YY=; b=e8vTlGHlonL/3dcFR6p9HeMfTr9S9mtzAmKhDA3nEUpbmBP99VfI/pzyNf6XwjMktS 155wRc7ntuFYEVA6yCCXqI/yY3HeSuJY441bYDsApNpEIgqOXNHLrxXIZzP4V94djG5k B5TQpYkD7+ug7gao7YSwMbWdemylHDPDMKfTTKWVsT1d4eT7ocz8WHRcUftEipC5si1Y QerZjSARXm7j4MFtVvkSvl9YdS5ybqViJoJFWXZwlprNwFJ8uG9AmCHQbm0T+/zvPamN 0wqvhG0492TJORfN00JdNsHggdzU7nJT6dezAU0P2LXTW+XzJfdla7gFEq/DSdoBXRA6 X03g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n184si1203054pgn.95.2018.12.06.14.23.20; Thu, 06 Dec 2018 14:23:36 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726050AbeLFWVe (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 6 Dec 2018 17:21:34 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:40332 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725939AbeLFWVd (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Dec 2018 17:21:33 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 698B6ED263; Thu, 6 Dec 2018 22:21:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com (segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com [10.19.60.26]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 34B025D9CB; Thu, 6 Dec 2018 22:21:32 +0000 (UTC) From: Jeff Moyer To: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Alexander Viro , Benjamin LaHaise , Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-aio@kvack.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Dan Carpenter Subject: Re: [PATCH] aio: Convert ioctx_table to XArray References: <20181128183531.5139-1-willy@infradead.org> X-PGP-KeyID: 1F78E1B4 X-PGP-CertKey: F6FE 280D 8293 F72C 65FD 5A58 1FF8 A7CA 1F78 E1B4 Date: Thu, 06 Dec 2018 17:21:31 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20181128183531.5139-1-willy@infradead.org> (Matthew Wilcox's message of "Wed, 28 Nov 2018 10:35:31 -0800") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.38]); Thu, 06 Dec 2018 22:21:33 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Matthew Wilcox writes: > This custom resizing array was vulnerable to a Spectre attack (speculating > off the end of an array to a user-controlled offset). The XArray is > not vulnerable to Spectre as it always masks its lookups to be within > the bounds of the array. I'm not a big fan of completely re-writing the code to fix this. Isn't the below patch sufficient? -Jeff diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c index 97f983592925..9402ae0b63d5 100644 --- a/fs/aio.c +++ b/fs/aio.c @@ -1038,6 +1038,7 @@ static struct kioctx *lookup_ioctx(unsigned long ctx_id) if (!table || id >= table->nr) goto out; + id = array_index_nospec(index, table->nr); ctx = rcu_dereference(table->table[id]); if (ctx && ctx->user_id == ctx_id) { if (percpu_ref_tryget_live(&ctx->users))