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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 14si8292137pgo.511.2018.12.09.14.05.43; Sun, 09 Dec 2018 14:05:58 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727412AbeLIWDp (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 9 Dec 2018 17:03:45 -0500 Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:35626 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726593AbeLIVz2 (ORCPT ); Sun, 9 Dec 2018 16:55:28 -0500 Received: from pub.yeoldevic.com ([81.174.156.145] helo=deadeye) by shadbolt.decadent.org.uk with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1gW72r-0002iq-A0; Sun, 09 Dec 2018 21:55:25 +0000 Received: from ben by deadeye with local (Exim 4.91) (envelope-from ) id 1gW72l-0003gy-Fj; Sun, 09 Dec 2018 21:55:19 +0000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , "David S. Miller" , "Richard Cochran" Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2018 21:50:33 +0000 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Subject: [PATCH 3.16 316/328] ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 81.174.156.145 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.62-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" commit efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba upstream. pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index info->pin_config. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Acked-by: Richard Cochran Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c +++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ #include #include +#include + #include "ptp_private.h" static int ptp_disable_pinfunc(struct ptp_clock_info *ops, @@ -228,6 +230,7 @@ long ptp_ioctl(struct posix_clock *pc, u err = -EINVAL; break; } + pin_index = array_index_nospec(pin_index, ops->n_pins); if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&ptp->pincfg_mux)) return -ERESTARTSYS; pd = ops->pin_config[pin_index]; @@ -246,6 +249,7 @@ long ptp_ioctl(struct posix_clock *pc, u err = -EINVAL; break; } + pin_index = array_index_nospec(pin_index, ops->n_pins); if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&ptp->pincfg_mux)) return -ERESTARTSYS; err = ptp_set_pinfunc(ptp, pin_index, pd.func, pd.chan);