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From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 11 Dec 2018 14:59:26 -0800
Message-ID: <CALCETrVArfAAbQKJ-g_5pOy6dMVgx-FC_mjdC9xzL1jU9T07jw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] x86/TSC: Use RDTSCP
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
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On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 2:23 PM Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
>
> From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
>
> Currently, the kernel uses
>
>   [LM]FENCE; RDTSC
>
> in the timekeeping code, to guarantee monotonicity of time where the
> *FENCE is selected based on vendor.
>
> Replace that sequence with RDTSCP which is faster or on-par and gives
> the same guarantees.
>
> A microbenchmark on Intel shows that the change is on-par.
>
> On AMD, the change is either on-par with the current LFENCE-prefixed
> RDTSC and some are slightly better with RDTSCP.
>
> The comparison is done with the LFENCE-prefixed RDTSC (and not with the
> MFENCE-prefixed one, as one would normally expect) because all modern
> AMD families make LFENCE serializing and thus avoid the heavy MFENCE by
> effectively enabling X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC.
>
> Co-developed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181119184556.11479-1-bp@alien8.de
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 16 ++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> index 91e4cf189914..5cc3930cb465 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> @@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc(void)
>   */
>  static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void)
>  {
> +       DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
> +
>         /*
>          * The RDTSC instruction is not ordered relative to memory
>          * access.  The Intel SDM and the AMD APM are both vague on this
> @@ -227,9 +229,19 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long long rdtsc_ordered(void)
>          * ordering guarantees as reading from a global memory location
>          * that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a
>          * time stamp.
> +        *
> +        * Thus, use the preferred barrier on the respective CPU, aiming for
> +        * RDTSCP as the default.
>          */
> -       barrier_nospec();
> -       return rdtsc();
> +       asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE_3("rdtsc",
> +                                  "mfence; rdtsc", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC,
> +                                  "lfence; rdtsc", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC,
> +                                  "rdtscp", X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)
> +                       : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high)
> +                       /* RDTSCP clobbers ECX with MSR_TSC_AUX. */
> +                       :: "ecx");
> +
> +       return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
>  }

This whole series seems reasonable, except that it caused me to look
at barrier_nospec().  And I had a bit of a WTF moment, as in "WTF does
RDTSC have to do with a speculation protection barrier".  Does it
actually make sense?