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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l66si15631973pfl.258.2018.12.12.07.16.30; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 07:16:45 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727792AbeLLPOr (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 10:14:47 -0500 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:31888 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726325AbeLLPOq (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 10:14:46 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Dec 2018 07:14:46 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,344,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="127286754" Received: from gao-cwp.sh.intel.com (HELO gao-cwp) ([10.239.159.28]) by fmsmga004.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Dec 2018 07:14:44 -0800 Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 23:18:26 +0800 From: Chao Gao To: Jan Beulich Cc: Roger Pau Monne , Jia-Ju Bai , Stefano Stabellini , xen-devel , Boris Ostrovsky , Juergen Gross , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen: xen-pciback: Reset MSI-X state when exposing a device Message-ID: <20181212151824.GA17227@gao-cwp> References: <1543976357-1053-1-git-send-email-chao.gao@intel.com> <20181205093223.dncg4nq4dh6xmrhk@mac> <20181212070654.GA13411@gao-cwp> <5C10CBF50200007800205596@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <5C10CBF50200007800205596@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 01:51:01AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 12.12.18 at 08:06, wrote: >> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 09:01:33AM -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >>>On 12/5/18 4:32 AM, Roger Pau Monn? wrote: >>>> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 10:19:17AM +0800, Chao Gao wrote: >>>>> I find some pass-thru devices don't work any more across guest reboot. >>>>> Assigning it to another guest also meets the same issue. And the only >>>>> way to make it work again is un-binding and binding it to pciback. >>>>> Someone reported this issue one year ago [1]. More detail also can be >>>>> found in [2]. >>>>> >>>>> The root-cause is Xen's internal MSI-X state isn't reset properly >>>>> during reboot or re-assignment. In the above case, Xen set maskall bit >>>>> to mask all MSI interrupts after it detected a potential security >>>>> issue. Even after device reset, Xen didn't reset its internal maskall >>>>> bit. As a result, maskall bit would be set again in next write to >>>>> MSI-X message control register. >>>>> >>>>> Given that PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix() also triggers Xen resetting MSI-X >>>>> internal state of a device, we employ it to fix this issue rather than >>>>> introducing another dedicated sub-hypercall. >>>>> >>>>> Note that PHYSDEVOPS_release_msix() will fail if the mapping between >>>>> the device's msix and pirq has been created. This limitation prevents >>>>> us calling this function when detaching a device from a guest during >>>>> guest shutdown. Thus it is called right before calling >>>>> PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix(). >>>> s/PHYSDEVOPS/PHYSDEVOP/ (no final S). And then I would also drop the >>>> () at the end of the hypercall name since it's not a function. >>>> >>>> I'm also wondering why the release can't be done when the device is >>>> detached from the guest (or the guest has been shut down). This makes >>>> me worry about the raciness of the attach/detach procedure: if there's >>>> a state where pciback assumes the device has been detached from the >>>> guest, but there are still pirqs bound, an attempt to attach to >>>> another guest in such state will fail. >>> >>>I wonder whether this additional reset functionality could be done out >>>of xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). We first do a (best effort) device reset >>>and then do the extra things that are not properly done there. >> >> No. It cannot be done in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove() without modifying >> the handler of PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. To do a successful Xen internal >> MSI-X state reset, PHYSDEVOP_{release, prepare}_msix should be finished >> without error. But ATM, xen expects that no msi is bound to pirq when >> doing PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. Otherwise it fails with error code -EBUSY. >> However, the expectation isn't guaranteed in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). >> In some cases, if qemu fails to unmap MSIs, MSIs are unmapped by Xen >> at last minute, which happens after device reset in >> xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). > >But that may need taking care of: I don't think it is a good idea to have >anything left from the prior owning domain when the device gets reset. >I.e. left over IRQ bindings should perhaps be forcibly cleared before >invoking the reset; Agree. How about pciback to track the established IRQ bindings? Then pciback can clear irq binding before invoking the reset. >in fact I'd expect this to happen in the course of >domain destruction, and I'd expect the device reset to come after the >domain was cleaned up. Perhaps simply an ordering issue in the tool >stack? I don't think reversing the sequences of device reset and domain destruction would be simple. Furthermore, during device hot-unplug, device reset is done when the owner is alive. So if we use domain destruction to enforce all irq binding cleared, in theory, it won't be applicable to hot-unplug case (if qemu's hot-unplug logic is compromised). Thanks Chao