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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d12si552542pga.506.2018.12.12.19.45.51; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 19:46:06 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726860AbeLMDnT (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 22:43:19 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:62439 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726355AbeLMDnT (ORCPT ); Wed, 12 Dec 2018 22:43:19 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Dec 2018 19:43:18 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,347,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="303412761" Received: from gao-cwp.sh.intel.com (HELO gao-cwp) ([10.239.159.28]) by fmsmga005.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Dec 2018 19:43:17 -0800 Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 11:46:59 +0800 From: Chao Gao To: Jan Beulich Cc: Roger Pau Monne , Jia-Ju Bai , Stefano Stabellini , xen-devel , Boris Ostrovsky , Juergen Gross , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen: xen-pciback: Reset MSI-X state when exposing a device Message-ID: <20181213034657.GA26926@gao-cwp> References: <1543976357-1053-1-git-send-email-chao.gao@intel.com> <20181205093223.dncg4nq4dh6xmrhk@mac> <20181212070654.GA13411@gao-cwp> <5C10CBF50200007800205596@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> <20181212151824.GA17227@gao-cwp> <5C112783020000780020589C@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <5C112783020000780020589C@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 08:21:39AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 12.12.18 at 16:18, wrote: >> On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 01:51:01AM -0700, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> On 12.12.18 at 08:06, wrote: >>>> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 09:01:33AM -0500, Boris Ostrovsky wrote: >>>>>On 12/5/18 4:32 AM, Roger Pau Monn? wrote: >>>>>> On Wed, Dec 05, 2018 at 10:19:17AM +0800, Chao Gao wrote: >>>>>>> I find some pass-thru devices don't work any more across guest reboot. >>>>>>> Assigning it to another guest also meets the same issue. And the only >>>>>>> way to make it work again is un-binding and binding it to pciback. >>>>>>> Someone reported this issue one year ago [1]. More detail also can be >>>>>>> found in [2]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The root-cause is Xen's internal MSI-X state isn't reset properly >>>>>>> during reboot or re-assignment. In the above case, Xen set maskall bit >>>>>>> to mask all MSI interrupts after it detected a potential security >>>>>>> issue. Even after device reset, Xen didn't reset its internal maskall >>>>>>> bit. As a result, maskall bit would be set again in next write to >>>>>>> MSI-X message control register. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Given that PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix() also triggers Xen resetting MSI-X >>>>>>> internal state of a device, we employ it to fix this issue rather than >>>>>>> introducing another dedicated sub-hypercall. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Note that PHYSDEVOPS_release_msix() will fail if the mapping between >>>>>>> the device's msix and pirq has been created. This limitation prevents >>>>>>> us calling this function when detaching a device from a guest during >>>>>>> guest shutdown. Thus it is called right before calling >>>>>>> PHYSDEVOPS_prepare_msix(). >>>>>> s/PHYSDEVOPS/PHYSDEVOP/ (no final S). And then I would also drop the >>>>>> () at the end of the hypercall name since it's not a function. >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm also wondering why the release can't be done when the device is >>>>>> detached from the guest (or the guest has been shut down). This makes >>>>>> me worry about the raciness of the attach/detach procedure: if there's >>>>>> a state where pciback assumes the device has been detached from the >>>>>> guest, but there are still pirqs bound, an attempt to attach to >>>>>> another guest in such state will fail. >>>>> >>>>>I wonder whether this additional reset functionality could be done out >>>>>of xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). We first do a (best effort) device reset >>>>>and then do the extra things that are not properly done there. >>>> >>>> No. It cannot be done in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove() without modifying >>>> the handler of PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. To do a successful Xen internal >>>> MSI-X state reset, PHYSDEVOP_{release, prepare}_msix should be finished >>>> without error. But ATM, xen expects that no msi is bound to pirq when >>>> doing PHYSDEVOP_release_msix. Otherwise it fails with error code -EBUSY. >>>> However, the expectation isn't guaranteed in xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). >>>> In some cases, if qemu fails to unmap MSIs, MSIs are unmapped by Xen >>>> at last minute, which happens after device reset in >>>> xen_pcibk_xenbus_remove(). >>> >>>But that may need taking care of: I don't think it is a good idea to have >>>anything left from the prior owning domain when the device gets reset. >>>I.e. left over IRQ bindings should perhaps be forcibly cleared before >>>invoking the reset; >> >> Agree. How about pciback to track the established IRQ bindings? Then >> pciback can clear irq binding before invoking the reset. > >How would pciback even know of those mappings, when it's qemu >who establishes (and manages) them? I meant to expose some interfaces from pciback. And pciback serves as the proxy of IRQ (un)binding APIs. > >>>in fact I'd expect this to happen in the course of >>>domain destruction, and I'd expect the device reset to come after the >>>domain was cleaned up. Perhaps simply an ordering issue in the tool >>>stack? >> >> I don't think reversing the sequences of device reset and domain >> destruction would be simple. Furthermore, during device hot-unplug, >> device reset is done when the owner is alive. So if we use domain >> destruction to enforce all irq binding cleared, in theory, it won't be >> applicable to hot-unplug case (if qemu's hot-unplug logic is >> compromised). > >Even in the hot-unplug case the tool stack could issue unbind >requests, behind the back of the possibly compromised qemu, >once neither the guest nor qemu have access to the device >anymore. But currently, tool stack doesn't know the remaining IRQ bindings. If tool stack can maintaine IRQ binding information of a pass-thru device (stored in Xenstore?), we can come up with a clean solution without modifying linux kernel and Xen. Thanks Chao