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Date:   Thu, 20 Dec 2018 12:34:00 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@enjellic.com>
Cc:     Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        "sean.j.christopherson@intel.com" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
        Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: x86/sgx: uapi change proposal
Message-ID: <20181220103400.GC26410@linux.intel.com>
References: <20181214215729.4221-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
 <7706b2aa71312e1f0009958bcab24e1e9d8d1237.camel@linux.intel.com>
 <598cd050-f0b5-d18c-96a0-915f02525e3e@fortanix.com>
 <20181219144343.GA31189@wind.enjellic.com>
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 08:43:43AM -0600, Dr. Greg wrote:
> I believe it is a silent response to the issues we were prosecuting
> 4-5 weeks ago, regarding the requirement for an SGX driver on an FLC
> hardware platform to have some semblance of policy management to be
> relevant from a security/privacy perspective.  It would have certainly
> been collegial to include a reference to our discussions and concerns
> in the changelog.
> 
> See 364f68f5a3c in Jarkko's next/master.
> 
> The changeset addresses enclave access to the PROVISION key but is
> still insufficient to deliver guarantees that are consistent with the
> SGX security model.  In order to achieve that, policy management needs
> to embrace the use of MRSIGNER values, which is what our SFLC patchset
> uses.
> 
> The noted changeset actually implements most of the 'kernel bloat'
> that our SFLC patchset needs to bolt onto.
> 
> As of yesterday afternoon next/master still won't initialize a
> non-trivial enclave.  Since there now appears to be a wholesale change
> in the driver architecture and UAPI we are sitting on the sidelines
> waiting for an indication all of that has some hope of working before
> we introduce our approach.
> 
> Part of SFLC won't be popular but it is driven by clients who are
> actually paying for SGX security engineering and architectures.

How many of these people are actually posting here?

/Jarkko