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R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.9 31/71] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:33:00 +0100 Message-Id: <20190107105334.540507957@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190107105330.280153213@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190107105330.280153213@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 5ae4f61f012a097df93de2285070ec8e34716d29 upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1000,6 +1001,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); if (ipcm->channels > 32) return -EINVAL; pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; @@ -1046,6 +1049,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock); spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);