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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org,
        "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 04/71] net: core: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date:   Mon,  7 Jan 2019 13:32:33 +0100
Message-Id: <20190107105330.536657603@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190107105330.280153213@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20190107105330.280153213@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

[ Upstream commit 50d5258634aee2e62832aa086d2fb0de00e72b91 ]

flen is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

net/core/filter.c:1101 bpf_check_classic() warn: potential spectre issue 'filter' [w]

Fix this by sanitizing flen before using it to index filter at line 1101:

	switch (filter[flen - 1].code) {

and through pc at line 1040:

	const struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/core/filter.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <net/dst_metadata.h>
 #include <net/dst.h>
 #include <net/sock_reuseport.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 /**
  *	sk_filter_trim_cap - run a packet through a socket filter
@@ -786,6 +787,7 @@ static int bpf_check_classic(const struc
 	bool anc_found;
 	int pc;
 
+	flen = array_index_nospec(flen, BPF_MAXINSNS + 1);
 	/* Check the filter code now */
 	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
 		const struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];