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R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.14 041/101] ALSA: emux: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:32:29 +0100 Message-Id: <20190107105335.153209841@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190107105330.372621917@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190107105330.372621917@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0 upstream. info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. These issues were detected with the help of Smatch: sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c +++ b/sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c @@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "emux_voice.h" - #define TMP_CLIENT_ID 0x1001 /* @@ -66,13 +66,16 @@ snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode(struct snd_emux return -EFAULT; if (info.mode < 0 || info.mode >= EMUX_MD_END) return -EINVAL; + info.mode = array_index_nospec(info.mode, EMUX_MD_END); if (info.port < 0) { for (i = 0; i < emu->num_ports; i++) emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value; } else { - if (info.port < emu->num_ports) + if (info.port < emu->num_ports) { + info.port = array_index_nospec(info.port, emu->num_ports); emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls[info.mode] = info.value; + } } return 0; }