Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp3735082imu; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 08:31:14 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN4Nj+66Ien37COPvKHOIdqoPrPGaU+AM0/ulT8oCHZutP3UFMAp46RKGoiEurDH+Uh/eQ64 X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:f091:: with SMTP id go17mr63349583plb.235.1546878674638; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 08:31:14 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1546878674; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=alqXKa1/A+KthPqLK271mMsZqzmECDJXQjhTG76jI55EF+VHeljfo2I22vwZuL27p6 QeCg8ZwBCu61RiVJg31hFSYyT2ttBxRv1fvcqWVkRi7SQBCwlggFyWGoTEog6WXPCZrQ D47P/4QmxbU5v0gIwMzKqOMQ84G3b5OJmgp5v3igl5yr8EDT8iwOlE9IG3gVV1XfKvV9 pSCkAtblNAcJRyC0Y/VdmZQBflB54E3AVblag4yRzmXLOvLqF8YS79f+VRVvRzaAZDy8 j0TlDrZRRceaN6itUVaOyvHm482L3jefa/0qt3L85i+A4j1OIXRLA1YIUN0iPy7oOI/f cO7w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=n4XsxHjku8xNF3h5HHmojQcyY5gNblFu54SxTKT4W2o=; b=ehkkxgZFxgmJSN7hajRVASzMdQmYkd4osyoH1zYCF5TW8lxSFOvZ5n3u6SzUE/c2C2 FK6vOeHvj6yheWvjvq1E12Xg4b6jSE4uw2VNGAymPaN+NSToQmlNgITcFy1GW1w96FEq X8cNrtUw3d1o+R36MmiX5eIhVWy0lnZu1uWLTKU/qfUCI8g2u2vBJhNmpk0QAAj91LmU VQl0OBLzHB+VNkOIeAM9a5fSZgkWwCmMSi8EteRY/30TTkuOVsuqDutOwSTN3n+NMJLv zpcImVzeD0mpnOKidh++fTIV/OFG8rU8f1WUtIYJf3CXW1KeTsiwzjHpJqAdxhTBBHKJ Betg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=qkxPo1Lz; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id s19si61033986plp.151.2019.01.07.08.30.59; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 08:31:14 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=qkxPo1Lz; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728576AbfAGNYF (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 08:24:05 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:46910 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727246AbfAGMea (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 07:34:30 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D04C2206BB; Mon, 7 Jan 2019 12:34:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1546864470; bh=OD2x5UdpT8US6ZRxOCp17jeJY49LnePFTKIkKOsbplk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qkxPo1Lz2CCGfxHqci046sePC95rzacyAC5KM1M+5DUGVuOKXYubPYJ7zs6Kf8J38 WUym5EX2AKbxYweLgHhAEqJTJaw0ECfIIjVY6uqnX9hV8M4Oz1JmaruQjLAa8qLFZw 6TlS75j8+n8zCOZQqsCRcFddzhmiAy7mtWaEpqnw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.20 022/145] ALSA: emu10k1: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:30:59 +0100 Message-Id: <20190107104440.219534335@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190107104437.308206189@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190107104437.308206189@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.20-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 5ae4f61f012a097df93de2285070ec8e34716d29 upstream. ipcm->substream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1031 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c:1075 snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->fx8010.pcm' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing ipcm->substream before using it to index emu->fx8010.pcm Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1026,6 +1027,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_poke(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); if (ipcm->channels > 32) return -EINVAL; pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; @@ -1072,6 +1075,8 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_ipcm_peek(struct if (ipcm->substream >= EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT) return -EINVAL; + ipcm->substream = array_index_nospec(ipcm->substream, + EMU10K1_FX8010_PCM_COUNT); pcm = &emu->fx8010.pcm[ipcm->substream]; mutex_lock(&emu->fx8010.lock); spin_lock_irq(&emu->reg_lock);