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R. Silva" , Takashi Iwai Subject: [PATCH 4.19 062/170] ALSA: pcm: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 13:31:29 +0100 Message-Id: <20190107104500.362790119@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190107104452.953560660@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190107104452.953560660@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gustavo A. R. Silva commit 94ffb030b6d31ec840bb811be455dd2e26a4f43e upstream. stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: sound/core/pcm.c:140 snd_pcm_control_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pcm->streams' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing stream before using it to index pcm->streams Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/pcm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- a/sound/core/pcm.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_control_ioctl(struct return -EFAULT; if (stream < 0 || stream > 1) return -EINVAL; + stream = array_index_nospec(stream, 2); if (get_user(subdevice, &info->subdevice)) return -EFAULT; mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);