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Date:   Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:07:03 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To:     joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
Cc:     "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org,
        keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>,
        Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>,
        Ryan Chen <yu.chen.surf@gmail.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Giovanni Gherdovich <ggherdovich@suse.cz>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5 v2][RFC] Encryption and authentication for hibernate
 snapshot image
Message-ID: <20190107180703.GE933@amd>
References: <20190103143227.9138-1-jlee@suse.com>
 <20190106181026.GA15256@amd>
 <20190107173743.GC4210@linux-l9pv.suse>
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Hi!

> Thanks for your review!
>=20
> > > The hibernate function can be used to snapshot memory pages to an ima=
ge,
> > > then kernel restores the image to memory space in a appropriate time.
> > > There have secrets in snapshot image and cracker may modifies it for
> > > hacking system. Encryption and authentication of snapshot image can p=
rotect
> > > the system.
> > >=20
> > > Hibernate function requests the master key through key retention serv=
ice.
> > > The snapshot master key can be a trusted key or a user defined key. T=
he
> > > name of snapshot master key is fixed to "swsusp-kmk". User should loa=
ds
> > > swsusp-kmk to kernel by keyctl tool before the hibernation resume.
> > > e.g. The swsusp-kmk must be loaded before systemd-hibernate-resume
> >=20
> > But if userspace has a key, encryption is useless against root.
> >
>=20
> Yes, but this concern is not only for hibernation encryption. This patch
> set does not provide solution against this concern.

So, can we postpone these patches until we have a solution secure
against root users?

> My security goals:
>=20
> - Encrypt and authicate hibernate snapshot image in kernel space. Userspa=
ce
>   can only touch an encrypted and signed snapshot image.
>=20
> - The code of encryption are in kernel. They will be signed and verify wi=
th
>   kernel binary when secure boot enabled. It's better than using
>   unauthenticated userspace code at runtime.

These are not goals. I'd like to understand why you want to put it into
kernel in the first place.
									Pavel
--=20
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blo=
g.html

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