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Date:   Tue, 8 Jan 2019 18:42:24 -0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
To:     Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
        Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
        Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
        Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        x86@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
        davem@davemloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/speculation: Add document to describe Spectre and
 its mitigations
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On Tue, Jan 08, 2019 at 05:41:37PM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> On 1/8/19 5:11 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> 
> >>
> >> Alexi,
> >>
> >> Do you have any suggestions on how to rewrite this two paragraphs?  You
> >> are probably the best person to update content for this section.
> > 
> > how about moving bpf bits out of this doc and placing them under Documentation/bpf/ ?
> > We can create bpf_security.rst there with specdown mitigations, best practices,
> > useful sysctl and config knobs, etc.
> > 
> 
> Maybe we can provide some minimum but accurate info here on this category of Spectre attack
> for completeness.  We can later provide a link to bpf_security.rst here with more details
> when that becomes available.
> 
> Otherwise, I can remove it if you prefer.  But people concerned about Spectre will most likely read
> this doc first.  I want them to be pointed to the detailed BPF security doc. 

since Documentation/ got converted to .rst, the links made it easy to follow
from one doc into another.
I think splitting big doc makes it easier for users to read
and for us to maintain/update.