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Date:   Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:32:43 -0500
From:   Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc:     Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
        Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in
 text_poke() where possible
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On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:


> > While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this instruction,
> > smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security exploit.  
> 
> Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern.  BTW,
> text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.

But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a bit
of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
pretty robust.

I would really like an acknowledgment from the HW vendors before we do
go this route.

-- Steve


> 
> The entire instruction doesn't need to be read atomically; just the
> 32-bit call destination.  Assuming the hypervisor is x86-64, and it uses
> a 32-bit access to read the call destination (which seems logical), the
> intra-cacheline reads will be atomic, as stated in the SDM.
> 
> If the above assumptions are not true, and the hypervisor reads the call
> destination non-atomically (which seems unlikely IMO), even then I don't
> see how it could be realistically exploitable.  It would just oops from
> calling a corrupt address.
>