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Date:   Thu, 17 Jan 2019 15:51:22 +0900
From:   Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To:     Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, linux_dti@icloud.com,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
        kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
        will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
        kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com,
        Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/17] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization
 enhancements
Message-Id: <20190117155122.46058c707d6d07237ad913d0@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190117003259.23141-10-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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        <20190117003259.23141-10-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
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On Wed, 16 Jan 2019 16:32:51 -0800
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> wrote:

> From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> 
> This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes
> module allocated pages non-executable. The patch sets the page as
> executable after allocation.
> 
> In the future, we may get better protection of executables. For example,
> by using hypercalls to request the hypervisor to protect VM executable
> pages from modifications using nested page-tables. This would allow
> us to ensure the executable has not changed between allocation and
> its write-protection.
> 
> While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
> masking.
> 

OK, then this should be done.

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

Thank you!


> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> index 4ba75afba527..fac692e36833 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
> @@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
>  	void *page;
>  
>  	page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> -	if (page)
> -		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> +	if (page == NULL)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * First make the page read-only, and then only then make it executable
> +	 * to prevent it from being W+X in between.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
> +	 * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
>  
>  	return page;
>  }
> @@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
>  /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
>  void free_insn_page(void *page)
>  {
> -	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> -	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
> +	/*
> +	 * First make the page non-executable, and then only then make it
> +	 * writable to prevent it from being W+X in between.
> +	 */
> +	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
> +	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
>  	module_memfree(page);
>  }
>  
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 


-- 
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>