Received: by 2002:ad5:474a:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i10csp976187imu; Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:41:56 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN4ukuTt2uOlxRRx/az3nixvoAYEPMn3iDfK9xPTv/UQfySguH7aBRay/KU/Ws06ZS4anWaf X-Received: by 2002:a62:5797:: with SMTP id i23mr166726pfj.162.1548456116899; Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:41:56 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1548456116; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=o6ECaJRbDOVwem19TpfLKMqTFBHCfbd2PHpQsQWvuqVADkIr0UH5tJkeUGeGTPRItZ mmk9tXhVzf6Yr7jDKZhpsq54Vbj/selUTWRonLIZlCPvpZhD5aX1dycVABA2IBXw5ZrW BWms8/WUxReWhul6wUA4Lsvr6UN0FpfCE2tduGrHD0rz/45y+lcb3I3Yt9hl1A9osv/y BFlG34u0RkZWUTQqE4azlKYLMAEI4hIF9fCcTOXa/8tlPlA5xk6wIR/LPPXgfXNcBFvq jFaoOm7cMLU4DQ3rgkE++lZVfkMCwEo5yckzrmTdHId3ldydUBvU0VqSfZAJDCRLd2/d FN1w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=yaqpKWY8GdW5pui4pByDOeV3D8O9bB/cCk6SRg/oKU0=; b=TShCXJhX2gpNdFLtS+JCXX3F9yH85GiO1IPXZoXVGnKRAtPEw6mqOFmm1GzZ1A71uF VNt2OU7veTfOZX6tpkGuW3OsGmK5XebJ/YN3p4rU4KVTXnmlLaekd9PPOFAw6njW/CoM Ya2ofklQKQdftAarjmh5nychXosrjixpime2n4i3+tSm0Ld46f9XQrrhzM647oxdwLuG 5ZukmyMyipHqAKQy6951nwjloYS4UrJGHJ0qUsnM9CNA5VqFLEV1turMsmgR/s2Irpzp /8pbfvoMHIGCihSQgCewb9DATSefR9y3uugoP/HX/XqxovwcmzqROBxMY+GlSZN7SYeH +eJA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c65si5583079pfe.202.2019.01.25.14.41.39; Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:41:56 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729134AbfAYWkR (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 25 Jan 2019 17:40:17 -0500 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:30833 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726218AbfAYWkR (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Jan 2019 17:40:17 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Jan 2019 14:40:16 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,523,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="117545028" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.14]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 25 Jan 2019 14:40:15 -0800 Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:40:15 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson To: Yang Weijiang Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, yu-cheng.yu@intel.com, yi.z.zhang@intel.com, hjl.tools@gmail.com, Zhang Yi Z Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] KVM:CPUID: Add CPUID support for CET xsaves component query. Message-ID: <20190125224015.GC21849@linux.intel.com> References: <20190122205909.24165-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> <20190122205909.24165-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190122205909.24165-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 04:59:05AM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote: > CET xsaves component size is queried through CPUID.(EAX=0xD, ECX=11) > and CPUID.(EAX=0xD, ECX=12). > > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang > --- > arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 +++ > arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 +++ > 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > index cb1aece25b17..dbeb4e7904eb 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c > @@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ > #include "trace.h" > #include "pmu.h" > > +extern u64 host_xss; Probably better to put this in x86.h next to host_xcr0. > + > static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted) > { > int feature_bit = 0; > @@ -65,6 +67,19 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void) > return xcr0; > } > > +u64 kvm_supported_xss(void) > +{ > + u64 xss = host_xss & KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS; > + > + /* > + * Either SHSTK or IBT feature depends on the xsaves component. > + */ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + xss &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER | XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL); This looks wrong, e.g. the SHSTK bits are allowed for SHSTK=false && IBT=true? And isn't this redundant, i.e. if the features aren't supported by the boot cpu then shouldn't the associated bits be cleared in host_xss? > + > + return xss; > +} > + > #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x) > > /* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */ > @@ -503,6 +518,16 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > * if the host doesn't support it. > */ > entry->edx |= F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES); > + /* > + * If host doesn't have CET capability, > + * do not report CET related info. > + */ > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + entry->ecx &= ~F(SHSTK); > + > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + entry->edx &= ~F(IBT); > + > } else { > entry->ebx = 0; > entry->ecx = 0; > @@ -564,14 +589,17 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > } > case 0xd: { > int idx, i; > - u64 supported = kvm_supported_xcr0(); > + u64 u_supported = kvm_supported_xcr0(); > + u64 s_supported = kvm_supported_xss(); > + u64 supported; > + int compacted; > > - entry->eax &= supported; > - entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, false); > + entry->eax &= u_supported; > + entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(u_supported, false); > entry->ecx = entry->ebx; > - entry->edx &= supported >> 32; > + entry->edx &= u_supported >> 32; > entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX; > - if (!supported) > + if (!u_supported) Should this be '!u_supported && !s_supported'? > break; > > for (idx = 1, i = 1; idx < 64; ++idx) { > @@ -583,19 +611,23 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > if (idx == 1) { > entry[i].eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features; > cpuid_mask(&entry[i].eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX); > - entry[i].ebx = 0; > - if (entry[i].eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC))) > - entry[i].ebx = > - xstate_required_size(supported, > - true); > + supported = u_supported | s_supported; > + compacted = entry[i].eax & > + (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC)); > + entry[i].ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, > + compacted); > + entry[i].ecx &= s_supported; > + entry[i].edx = 0; > } else { > + supported = (entry[i].ecx & 1) ? s_supported : > + u_supported; > if (entry[i].eax == 0 || !(supported & mask)) > continue; > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(entry[i].ecx & 1)) > - continue; > + entry[i].ecx &= 1; > + entry[i].edx = 0; > + if (entry[i].ecx) > + entry[i].ebx = 0; > } > - entry[i].ecx = 0; > - entry[i].edx = 0; > entry[i].flags |= > KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX; > ++*nent; > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > index a0f8b71b2132..b0ae24913423 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_entries[] = { > }; > > u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0; > +u64 __read_mostly host_xss; > > static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt); > > @@ -6838,6 +6839,9 @@ int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque) > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) > host_xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK); > > + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES)) > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, host_xss); > + > kvm_lapic_init(); > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 > pvclock_gtod_register_notifier(&pvclock_gtod_notifier); > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h > index 224cd0a47568..c61da41c3c5c 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h > @@ -283,6 +283,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2, > | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS \ > | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \ > | XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) > + > +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER \ > + | XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL) > + > extern u64 host_xcr0; > > extern u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void); > -- > 2.17.1 >