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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>,
        Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
        Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@gmail.com>,
        Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 080/103] can: bcm: check timer values before ktime conversion
Date:   Tue, 29 Jan 2019 12:35:57 +0100
Message-Id: <20190129113206.039736741@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20190129113159.567154026@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20190129113159.567154026@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.19-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>

commit 93171ba6f1deffd82f381d36cb13177872d023f6 upstream.

Kyungtae Kim detected a potential integer overflow in bcm_[rx|tx]_setup()
when the conversion into ktime multiplies the given value with NSEC_PER_USEC
(1000).

Reference: https://marc.info/?l=linux-can&m=154732118819828&w=2

Add a check for the given tv_usec, so that the value stays below one second.
Additionally limit the tv_sec value to a reasonable value for CAN related
use-cases of 400 days and ensure all values to be positive.

Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= 2.6.26
Tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/can/bcm.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)

--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@
  */
 #define MAX_NFRAMES 256
 
+/* limit timers to 400 days for sending/timeouts */
+#define BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX (400 * 24 * 60 * 60)
+
 /* use of last_frames[index].flags */
 #define RX_RECV    0x40 /* received data for this element */
 #define RX_THR     0x80 /* element not been sent due to throttle feature */
@@ -140,6 +143,22 @@ static inline ktime_t bcm_timeval_to_kti
 	return ktime_set(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec * NSEC_PER_USEC);
 }
 
+/* check limitations for timeval provided by user */
+static bool bcm_is_invalid_tv(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head)
+{
+	if ((msg_head->ival1.tv_sec < 0) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival1.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec < 0) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival1.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec < 0) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_sec > BCM_TIMER_SEC_MAX) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec < 0) ||
+	    (msg_head->ival2.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 #define CFSIZ(flags) ((flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) ? CANFD_MTU : CAN_MTU)
 #define OPSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_op)
 #define MHSIZ sizeof(struct bcm_msg_head)
@@ -873,6 +892,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 	if (msg_head->nframes < 1 || msg_head->nframes > MAX_NFRAMES)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check timeval limitations */
+	if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* check the given can_id */
 	op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
 	if (op) {
@@ -1053,6 +1076,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
 	     (!(msg_head->can_id & CAN_RTR_FLAG))))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* check timeval limitations */
+	if ((msg_head->flags & SETTIMER) && bcm_is_invalid_tv(msg_head))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* check the given can_id */
 	op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
 	if (op) {