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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org,
        Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>,
        Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
        William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 41/46] mm: hwpoison: use do_send_sig_info() instead of force_sig()
Date:   Mon,  4 Feb 2019 11:37:12 +0100
Message-Id: <20190204103615.917770720@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>

commit 6376360ecbe525a9c17b3d081dfd88ba3e4ed65b upstream.

Currently memory_failure() is racy against process's exiting, which
results in kernel crash by null pointer dereference.

The root cause is that memory_failure() uses force_sig() to forcibly
kill asynchronous (meaning not in the current context) processes.  As
discussed in thread https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/8/236 years ago for OOM
fixes, this is not a right thing to do.  OOM solves this issue by using
do_send_sig_info() as done in commit d2d393099de2 ("signal:
oom_kill_task: use SEND_SIG_FORCED instead of force_sig()"), so this
patch is suggesting to do the same for hwpoison.  do_send_sig_info()
properly accesses to siglock with lock_task_sighand(), so is free from
the reported race.

I confirmed that the reported bug reproduces with inserting some delay
in kill_procs(), and it never reproduces with this patch.

Note that memory_failure() can send another type of signal using
force_sig_mceerr(), and the reported race shouldn't happen on it because
force_sig_mceerr() is called only for synchronous processes (i.e.
BUS_MCEERR_AR happens only when some process accesses to the corrupted
memory.)

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190116093046.GA29835@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reported-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/memory-failure.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/mm/memory-failure.c
+++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
@@ -339,7 +339,8 @@ static void kill_procs(struct list_head
 			if (fail || tk->addr_valid == 0) {
 				pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: forcibly killing %s:%d because of failure to unmap corrupted page\n",
 				       pfn, tk->tsk->comm, tk->tsk->pid);
-				force_sig(SIGKILL, tk->tsk);
+				do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV,
+						 tk->tsk, PIDTYPE_PID);
 			}
 
 			/*