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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h9si11116785plb.180.2019.02.11.06.55.20; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:55:36 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=Pt1o4DMZ; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388558AbfBKOxG (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 11 Feb 2019 09:53:06 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39418 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388549AbfBKOxC (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Feb 2019 09:53:02 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 63E8A20844; Mon, 11 Feb 2019 14:53:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1549896781; bh=/DYNAq4E+w0EbojMQiOwtcvT7xcT5awcnlST3Gxocd0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Pt1o4DMZVIgBO2fmjZtuHpdO2m5viRIm8Izma1t2o7yzDhQ/09kb1WBWg9EHfxBox AZPY83xQ4iIsqORoFS00+lmz5YbmOgueEILee1WLjSCL8RX6AFSYdToKJwBgr14C6n AUnjdCYs4XF2/4Wqm735GL8SnmZVQrdAmJjdkGhc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Felix Wilhelm , stable@kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini Subject: [PATCH 4.19 300/313] KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents (CVE-2019-7222) Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 15:19:40 +0100 Message-Id: <20190211141912.946431183@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190211141852.749630980@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190211141852.749630980@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Paolo Bonzini commit 353c0956a618a07ba4bbe7ad00ff29fe70e8412a upstream. Bugzilla: 1671930 Emulation of certain instructions (VMXON, VMCLEAR, VMPTRLD, VMWRITE with memory operand, INVEPT, INVVPID) can incorrectly inject a page fault when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address. The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory as the CR2 and error code. The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just ensure that the error code and CR2 are zero. Embargoed until Feb 7th 2019. Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -4904,6 +4904,13 @@ int kvm_read_guest_virt(struct kvm_vcpu { u32 access = (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0; + /* + * FIXME: this should call handle_emulation_failure if X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED + * is returned, but our callers are not ready for that and they blindly + * call kvm_inject_page_fault. Ensure that they at least do not leak + * uninitialized kernel stack memory into cr2 and error code. + */ + memset(exception, 0, sizeof(*exception)); return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access, exception); }