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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d4si3156612pfa.150.2019.02.14.10.23.58; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 10:24:13 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2406730AbfBNKsN (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 14 Feb 2019 05:48:13 -0500 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:41168 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2395351AbfBNKsD (ORCPT ); Thu, 14 Feb 2019 05:48:03 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EB62DEBD; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 02:48:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.162.0.144] (a075553-lin.blr.arm.com [10.162.0.144]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 207BC3F575; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 02:47:59 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] arm64/kvm: add a userspace option to enable pointer authentication To: James Morse Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Marc Zyngier , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Kristina Martsenko , kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, Ramana Radhakrishnan , Dave Martin , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <1548658727-14271-1-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> <1548658727-14271-5-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> <1e3f2a9a-e3f7-bb06-495a-24f77a73cae0@arm.com> From: Amit Daniel Kachhap Message-ID: Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 16:17:57 +0530 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.4.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1e3f2a9a-e3f7-bb06-495a-24f77a73cae0@arm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, On 1/31/19 9:57 PM, James Morse wrote: > Hi Amit, > > On 28/01/2019 06:58, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote: >> This feature will allow the KVM guest to allow the handling of >> pointer authentication instructions or to treat them as undefined >> if not set. It uses the existing vcpu API KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT to >> supply this parameter instead of creating a new API. >> >> A new register is not created to pass this parameter via >> SET/GET_ONE_REG interface as just a flag (KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH) >> supplied is enough to enable this feature. > > >> diff --git a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt > b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt >> index a25cd21..0529a7d 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt >> +++ b/Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt >> @@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ pointers). >> Virtualization >> -------------- >> >> -Pointer authentication is not currently supported in KVM guests. KVM >> -will mask the feature bits from ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, and attempted use of >> -the feature will result in an UNDEFINED exception being injected into >> -the guest. >> +Pointer authentication is enabled in KVM guest when virtual machine is >> +created by passing a flag (KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH) > > Isn't that a VCPU flag? Shouldn't this be when each VCPU is created? Yes it is a VCPU flag. > > >> requesting this feature >> +to be enabled. Without this flag, pointer authentication is not enabled >> +in KVM guests and attempted use of the feature will result in an UNDEFINED >> +exception being injected into the guest. > > ... what happens if KVM's user-space enables ptrauth on some vcpus, but not on > others? Yes seems to be issue. Let me check more on this if there are other ways of passing the userspace parameter such as in CREATE_VM type ioctl. > > You removed the id-register suppression in the previous patch, but it doesn't > get hooked up to kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed() here. (you could add > kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed() earlier, and default it to true to make it easier). > > Doesn't this mean that if the CPU supports pointer auth, but user-space doesn't > specify this flag, the guest gets mysterious undef's whenever it tries to use > the advertised feature? Agree, ID registers should be masked when userspace disables it. > > (whether we support big/little virtual-machines is probably a separate issue, > but the id registers need to be consistent with our trap-and-undef behaviour) > > >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> index c798d0c..4a6ec40 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> @@ -453,14 +453,15 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_requires_vhe(void) >> >> void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> +bool kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> >> static inline void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> { >> /* Disable ptrauth and use it in a lazy context via traps */ >> - if (has_vhe() && kvm_supports_ptrauth()) >> + if (has_vhe() && kvm_supports_ptrauth() >> + && kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu)) >> kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu); >> } >> - >> void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> > >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c >> index 5b980e7..c0e5dcd 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c >> @@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run) >> */ >> void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> { >> - if (has_vhe() && kvm_supports_ptrauth()) >> + if (has_vhe() && kvm_supports_ptrauth() >> + && kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu)) > > Duplication. If has_vhe() moved into kvm_supports_ptrauth(), and > kvm_supports_ptrauth() was called from kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed() it would > be clearer that use of this feature was becoming user-controlled policy. > > (We don't need to list the dependencies at every call site) ok. > > >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c >> index 0576c01..369624f 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c >> @@ -42,3 +42,16 @@ void __no_ptrauth __hyp_text __ptrauth_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, >> ptrauth_keys_store((struct ptrauth_keys *) &guest_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]); >> ptrauth_keys_switch((struct ptrauth_keys *) &host_ctxt->sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]); >> } >> + >> +/** >> + * kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed - checks if ptrauth feature is present in vcpu > > ('enabled by KVM's user-space' may be clearer. 'Present in vcpu' could be down > to a cpufeature thing) ok. > > >> + * >> + * @vcpu: The VCPU pointer >> + * >> + * This function will be used to enable/disable ptrauth in guest as configured > > ... but it just tests the bit ... > >> + * by the KVM userspace API. >> + */ >> +bool kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) >> +{ >> + return test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH, vcpu->arch.features); >> +} > > > Thanks, > > James > //Amit