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Long" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.9 08/58] ARM: 8794/1: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 14:43:29 +0100 Message-Id: <20190218133509.231691321@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190218133508.567416115@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190218133508.567416115@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ Commit 621afc677465db231662ed126ae1f355bf8eac47 upstream. A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Porting commit c2f0ad4fc089cff8 ("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit"). Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: David A. Long Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h index 7b17460127fd..9ae888775743 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -99,6 +99,14 @@ extern int __put_user_bad(void); static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs) { current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs; + + /* + * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding + * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation. + */ + dsb(nsh); + isb(); + modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER); } -- 2.19.1