Received: by 2002:ac0:946b:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id j40csp2464059imj; Mon, 18 Feb 2019 06:29:29 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AHgI3IZqhqiC0GpbToQy4hotGuF33RfHeVHY5muNyPOpsWCxngXsUR+uTwGKowu+bjnSZtuiXXI7 X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:c05:: with SMTP id 5mr25794339pls.155.1550500169270; Mon, 18 Feb 2019 06:29:29 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1550500169; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=tDvEMgs6+91CMygbEku71g6IRLnRWOa7GocM/EZraYrgPJQsTuNAmTBiGgkavbvc81 7kXqeuCW8sPmN/14/08+yXEvRGofnn+hMa0VUGf45LQR8PbuuT4tjovaHo6wAcg8950O 414JiiyFaxUH4Yg/2e6oa0WkX0671EkzaKhqAn9WZA/kjtAMIYbor468LlrxjGyzBl+X qnmaI7j9uVpGOcJ4WsmYt2WtexLqQMOGii0ZaFC6bG+hEcuA0anumwwD7bFCAjRQjuxc inMgwfrM2kFSl19iCciK3ONx4sak3h1Rue5pzvuBI9ExiFQ19nYLE4mCPiRWAXEXa7BB MO7w== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=Uq5kbLMDiGhXyT3hO0b6JO6is2aJ/7occJJVtlgjVZ4=; b=DHTxh17e3MUVVvtMB9CEUDWKEaw3dErQqxdbCZ1TA8UvH/dKp6wAXTasPzDOr6WC8w +RZ5mGadx1QPAWtjyXUN17+LM6UxLwxTNcbHv/+524KZLb5TnXoNAZArlwQgk+uRUDuB NJQ0T1nhf4aAvAZGVagl/99eSvOSojHUBHovyEpSj9n/FQtqiny4iC5zexJ86t51Uk9R B2GUOgKsYO+1DFQmco+/A1mxssa0lhVej01VBBjze8QLcWelTyXA5u1uNRxH/PPOe47j hRuci1taBkQoZlFrcC49auRyc62yX/3b1eWljydp2cwPUnZ/YVpzqEPeZ/1uI1f2FCYr bycg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=RySgQwkd; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id l10si14097659pfb.283.2019.02.18.06.29.13; Mon, 18 Feb 2019 06:29:29 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=RySgQwkd; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388884AbfBROAm (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 18 Feb 2019 09:00:42 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:41914 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388870AbfBROAi (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 Feb 2019 09:00:38 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8D6DF21902; Mon, 18 Feb 2019 14:00:37 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1550498438; bh=XseDgABFK0MywURQvbsVaEKSJIwmD7RKkT0XRJWLpQ0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=RySgQwkdB4h90tIi27t2d3QNwAuD9nj/QHrE/vpVdnYA6bORLqPGXA0s2u9ZNyS9A VZpAc0j3Vugvk1O1XH7e8YGDYyGK5zL39ScOIgW5+RB9E33hr9S2kR1rJ/So74BucU Anrs7sPEYzyiqEi0C6ydkyFmstTuVCbO1GyuWNdw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Daniel Vetter , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.4 001/143] drm/bufs: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Mon, 18 Feb 2019 14:42:09 +0100 Message-Id: <20190218133529.159747802@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190218133529.099444112@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190218133529.099444112@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ [ Upstream commit a37805098900a6e73a55b3a43b7d3bcd987bb3f4 ] idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c:1420 drm_legacy_freebufs() warn: potential spectre issue 'dma->buflist' [r] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index dma->buflist Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181016095549.GA23586@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c index f1a204d253cc..ac22b8d86249 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include #include "drm_legacy.h" +#include + static struct drm_map_list *drm_find_matching_map(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_local_map *map) { @@ -1332,6 +1334,7 @@ int drm_legacy_freebufs(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, idx, dma->buf_count - 1); return -EINVAL; } + idx = array_index_nospec(idx, dma->buf_count); buf = dma->buflist[idx]; if (buf->file_priv != file_priv) { DRM_ERROR("Process %d freeing buffer not owned\n", -- 2.19.1