Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Tue, 3 Apr 2001 04:02:09 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Tue, 3 Apr 2001 04:02:00 -0400 Received: from mailout04.sul.t-online.com ([194.25.134.18]:56593 "EHLO mailout04.sul.t-online.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Tue, 3 Apr 2001 04:01:54 -0400 From: Amon Ott To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Announce: RSBAC v1.1.1 released Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 09:57:47 +0200 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.29.2] Content-Type: text/plain MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <01033009555302.00919@marvin> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi! Rule Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) version 1.1.1 has been released. Information and downloads are available from http://www.rsbac.org Amon Ott. --------------------------------------- Name: rsbac Version: 1.1.1 Kernelver: 2.2.18-19, 2.4.2-3 Status: 9 (UP), 8 (SMP) Author: Amon Ott Maintainer: Amon Ott Description: Rule Set Based Access Control (RSBAC) Date: 28-March-2001 Descfile-URL: http://www.rsbac.org/rsbac.desc Download-URL: http://www.rsbac.org/download.htm Homepage-URL: http://www.rsbac.org/ Manual-URL: http://www.rsbac.org/instadm.htm What is RSBAC? -------------- RSBAC is a flexible, powerful and fast open source access control framework for current Linux kernels, which has been in stable production use for over a year (since version 1.0.9a). The standard package includes a range of access control models like MAC, RC, ACL (see below). Furthermore, the runtime registration facility (REG) makes it easy to implement your own access control model as a kernel module and get it registered at runtime. The RSBAC framework is based on the Generalized Framework for Access Control (GFAC) by Abrams and LaPadula. All security relevant system calls are extended by security enforcement code. This code calls the central decision component, which in turn calls all active decision modules and generates a combined decision. This decision is then enforced by the system call extensions. Decisions are based on the type of access (request type), the access target and on the values of attributes attached to the subject calling and to the target to be accessed. Additional independent attributes can be used by individual modules, e.g. the privacy module (PM). All attributes are stored in fully protected directories, one on each mounted device. Thus changes to attributes require special system calls provided. As all types of access decisions are based on general decision requests, many different security policies can be implemented as a decision module. Apart from the builtin models shown below, the optional Module Registration (REG) allows for registration of additional, individual decision modules at runtime. In RSBAC version 1.1.1, the following modules are included. Please note that all modules are optional. They are described in detail in an extra text. MAC: Bell-LaPadula Mandatory Access Control (compartments limited to a number of 64) FC: Functional Control. A simple role based model, restricting access to security information to security officers and access to system information to administrators. SIM: Security Information Modification. Only security administrators are allowed to modify data labeled as security information PM: Privacy Model. Simone Fischer-H?bner's Privacy Model in its first implementation. See our paper on PM implementation (43K) for the National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC 98) MS: Malware Scan. Scan all files for malware on execution (optionally on all file read accesses or on all TCP/UDP read accesses), deny access if infected. Currently the Linux viruses Bliss.A and Bliss.B and a handfull of others are detected. See our paper on Approaches to Integrated Malware Detection and Avoidance (34K) for The Third Nordic Workshop on Secure IT Systems (Nordsec'98) FF: File Flags. Provide and use flags for dirs and files, currently execute_only (files), read_only (files and dirs), search_only (dirs), secure_delete (files), no_execute (files), add_inherited (files and dirs) and no_rename_or_delete(files and dirs, no inheritance). Only security officers may modify these flags. RC: Role Compatibility. Defines 64 roles and 64 types for each target type (file, dir, dev, ipc, scd, process). For each role, compatibility to all types and to other roles can be set individually and with request granularity. For administration there is a fine grained separation-of-duty. AUTH: Authorization enforcement. Controls all CHANGE_OWNER requests for process targets, only programs/processes with general setuid allowance and those with a capability for the target user ID may setuid. Capabilities can be controlled by other programs/processes, e.g. authentication daemons. ACL: Access Control Lists. For every object there is an Access Control List, defining which subjects may access this object with which request types. Subjects can be of type user, RC role and ACL group. Objects are grouped by their target type, but have individual ACLs. If there is no ACL entry for a subject at an object, rights are inherited from parent objects, restricted by an inheritance mask. Direct (user) and indirect (role, group) rights are accumulated. For each object type there is a default ACL on top of the normal hierarchy. Group management has been added in version 1.0.9a. A general goal of RSBAC design has been to some day reach (obsolete) Orange Book (TCSEC) B1 level. Now it is mostly targeting to be useful as secure and multi-purposed networked system, with special interest in firewalls. RSBAC Changes ------------- 1.1.1: - New target type FIFO, with a lot of cleanup, e.g. IPC type fifo removed - MAC module reworked, including MAC-Light option - Several bugfixes - Port to 2.4.0, 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 - New Makefiles with lists for 2.4 and without for 2.2 kernels (Thanks to Edward Brocklesby for samples) - init process default ACI now partly depends on root's ACI - Optional interception of sys_read and sys_write. Attention: you might have to add READ and WRITE rights to files, fifos, dirs and sockets first, if upgrading from an older version - REG overhaul. Now you can register syscall functions, everything is kept in unlimited lists instead of arrays and registering is versioned to allow for binary module shipping with REG version checks. - Inheritance is now fixed, except for MAC model - MAC: optional inheritance, new option Smart Inheritance that tries to avoid new attribute objects (see config help) - New soft mode option: all decisions and logging are performed, but DO_NOT_CARE is returned to enforcement. Off by default. See config help for details. - Optional initialization in extra rsbac_initd thread. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/