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Date:   Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:24:47 -0500
From:   Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, will.deacon@arm.com,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
        Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, daniel@iogearbox.net,
        netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2 v2] kprobe: Do not use uaccess functions to access
 kernel memory that can fault
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On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:27:05AM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 09:43:14AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > 
> > Then we should still probably fix up "__probe_kernel_read()" to not
> > allow user accesses. The easiest way to do that is actually likely to
> > use the "unsafe_get_user()" functions *without* doing a
> > uaccess_begin(), which will mean that modern CPU's will simply fault
> > on a kernel access to user space.
> 
> On bpf side the bpf_probe_read() helper just calls probe_kernel_read()
> and users pass both user and kernel addresses into it and expect
> that the helper will actually try to read from that address.

Slightly related and FWIW, BCC's eBPF-based opensnoop tool [1] installs a
kprobe on do_sys_open to monitor calls to the open syscall globally.

do_sys_open() has prototype:

long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, umode_t mode);

This causes a "blank" filename to be displayed by opensnoop when I run it on
my Pixel 3 (arm64), possibly because this is a user pointer. However, it
works fine on x86-64.

So it seems to me that on arm64, reading user pointers directly still doesn't
work even if there is a distinction between user/kernel addresses. In that
case reading the user pointer using user accessors (possibly using
bpf_probe_user_read helper) should be needed to fix this issue (as Yonghong
also privately discussed with me).

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/blob/master/tools/opensnoop.py#L140

thanks!

 - Joel


> 
> If __probe_kernel_read will suddenly start failing on all user addresses
> it will break the expectations.
> How do we solve it in bpf_probe_read?
> Call probe_kernel_read and if that fails call unsafe_get_user byte-by-byte
> in the loop?
> That's doable, but people already complain that bpf_probe_read() is slow
> and shows up in their perf report.
>