Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CACdnJuvW47m3JvEcuEX1bsr+L2Ht9LDn_iCuPbHLOoaohOFW4Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1551392438.10911.227.camel@linux.ibm.com> <CACdnJuvwnh0PKr5jUTm2h=P5-u-oLgBjvThX+DxcegShXReCdA@mail.gmail.com>
 <1551398720.10911.270.camel@linux.ibm.com> <CACdnJutqg26pk5xnK2ii3ia9JabAnBptE3YQ3yLvVT93as666Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <1551404654.10911.276.camel@linux.ibm.com>
In-Reply-To: <1551404654.10911.276.camel@linux.ibm.com>
From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 28 Feb 2019 19:33:16 -0800
Message-ID: <CACdnJuvn4uC075+Z99CaO3YGjJ+4nviPj=4TEQpkndC3JwFovg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     jmorris@namei.org,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 5:45 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
> > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for
> > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures
> > > from enabling "lock down".  This just means that there needs to be
> > > some coordination between the different signature verification
> > > methods. [1][2]
> >
> > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible
> > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do
> > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to
> > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before
> > merging the patchset.
>
> That's simply not true.  Have you even looked at the IMA architecture
> patches?

Sorry, I think we're talking at cross purposes - I was referring to
your patch "ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode"
(https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit/?h=efi-lock-down&id=7fa3734bd31a4b3fe71358fcba8d4878e5005b7f).
If the goal is just to use the architecture rules then I don't see any
conflict, and as far as I can tell things would just work as is if I
drop the ima portion from "kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the
kernel is locked down"? Apologies, I'd thought that the secure_boot
ruleset was still intended to be used in a lockdown environment.