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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id d1si19302195pll.283.2019.02.28.23.00.27; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 23:00:43 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731833AbfCAG7I (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:59:08 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:58694 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725982AbfCAG7H (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 01:59:07 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.72.51.249]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B08BEBD; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 22:59:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from [172.20.0.134] (usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com [217.140.101.70]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2E2D93F5C1; Thu, 28 Feb 2019 22:59:06 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 To: Jeremy Linton , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, julien.thierry@arm.com, mlangsdo@redhat.com, stefan.wahren@i2e.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20190227010544.597579-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com> <20190227010544.597579-8-jeremy.linton@arm.com> From: Andre Przywara Message-ID: Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 00:59:03 -0600 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190227010544.597579-8-jeremy.linton@arm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hi, On 2/26/19 7:05 PM, Jeremy Linton wrote: > Add code to track whether all the cores in the machine are > vulnerable, and whether all the vulnerable cores have been > mitigated. > > Once we have that information we can add the sysfs stub and > provide an accurate view of what is known about the machine. > > Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > index a27e1ee750e1..0f6e8f5d67bc 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c > @@ -513,6 +513,10 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) > .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \ > CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list) > > +/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */ > +static bool __hardenbp_enab = true; > +static bool __spectrev2_safe = true; > + > /* > * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all. > */ > @@ -523,6 +527,10 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = { > { /* sentinel */ } > }; > > +/* > + * Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine. > + * We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe. > + */ > static bool __maybe_unused > check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) > { > @@ -544,19 +552,25 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) > if (!need_wa) > return false; > > + __spectrev2_safe = false; > + > if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) { > pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by configuration\n"); > + __hardenbp_enab = false; > return false; > } > > /* forced off */ > if (__nospectre_v2) { > pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n"); > + __hardenbp_enab = false; > return false; > } > > - if (need_wa < 0) > + if (need_wa < 0) { > pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n"); > + __hardenbp_enab = false; > + } > > return (need_wa > 0); > } > @@ -779,3 +793,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, > { > return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); > } > + > +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, > + char *buf) w/s issue Anyway: Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara Cheers, Andre. > +{ > + if (__spectrev2_safe) > + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); > + > + if (__hardenbp_enab) > + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n"); > + > + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); > +} >