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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i190si21576232pfc.116.2019.03.01.07.00.59; Fri, 01 Mar 2019 07:01:15 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2388631AbfCAO6V (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 09:58:21 -0500 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:32203 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732668AbfCAO6V (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Mar 2019 09:58:21 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNSCANNABLE X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 01 Mar 2019 06:58:20 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.58,427,1544515200"; d="scan'208";a="128242057" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.181]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 01 Mar 2019 06:58:19 -0800 Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 06:58:19 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson To: Yang Weijiang Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, yu-cheng.yu@intel.com, Zhang Yi Z Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 6/8] KVM:VMX: Load Guest CET via VMCS when CET is enabled in Guest Message-ID: <20190301145819.GC22584@linux.intel.com> References: <20190225132716.6982-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> <20190225132716.6982-7-weijiang.yang@intel.com> <20190228161715.GF6166@linux.intel.com> <20190228083844.GC12006@local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190228083844.GC12006@local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 04:38:44PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote: > On Thu, Feb 28, 2019 at 08:17:15AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 09:27:14PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote: > > > "Load Guest CET state" bit controls whether guest CET states > > > will be loaded at Guest entry. Before doing that, KVM needs > > > to check if CPU CET feature is available. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z > > > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang > > > --- > > > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > > index 89ee086e1729..d32cee9ee079 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c > > > @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ > > > #include > > > #include > > > #include > > > +#include > > > > > > #include "trace.h" > > > #include "pmu.h" > > > @@ -4065,6 +4066,20 @@ static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, > > > return !(val & ~valid_bits); > > > } > > > > > > +static int vmx_guest_cet_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > > +{ > > > + u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Guest CET can work as long as HW supports the feature, independent > > > + * to Host SW enabling status. > > > + */ > > > + cpuid_count(7, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); > > > + > > > + return ((ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) | > > > + (edx & bit(X86_FEATURE_IBT))) ? 1 : 0; > > > > Given the holes in the (current) architecture/spec, I think KVM has to > > require both features to be supported in the guest to allow CR4.CET to > > be enabled. > The reason why I use a "OR" here is to keep CET enabling control the > same as that on host, right now on host, users can select to enable SHSTK or IBT > feature by disabling the unexpected one. It's free to select SHSTK & IBT > or SHSTK | IBT. Which is not the same as SHSTK != IBT in *hardware*, which is effectively what this is allowing for the guest. The problem is that the architecture doesn't cleanly separate the two features, i.e. we'd have a virtualization hole where the guest could touch state for a disabled feature. Regardless, the guest would still be able to selectively enable each CET feature, it would just never see a model where SHSTK != IBT.