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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.20 88/88] x86/uaccess: Dont leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation
Date:   Mon,  4 Mar 2019 09:23:11 +0100
Message-Id: <20190304081634.180902760@linuxfoundation.org>
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4.20-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

commit 2a418cf3f5f1caf911af288e978d61c9844b0695 upstream.

When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end().  If that code
were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.

Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.

This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.

 [ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]

Fixes: 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -293,8 +293,7 @@ do {									\
 		__put_user_asm(x, ptr, retval, "l", "k", "ir", errret);	\
 		break;							\
 	case 8:								\
-		__put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, retval,	\
-				   errret);				\
+		__put_user_asm_u64(x, ptr, retval, errret);		\
 		break;							\
 	default:							\
 		__put_user_bad();					\
@@ -440,8 +439,10 @@ do {									\
 #define __put_user_nocheck(x, ptr, size)			\
 ({								\
 	int __pu_err;						\
+	__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val;				\
+	__pu_val = x;						\
 	__uaccess_begin();					\
-	__put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);	\
+	__put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT);\
 	__uaccess_end();					\
 	__builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0);				\
 })