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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers
To:     James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
        Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
        kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
        Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
        Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
References: <1550568271-5319-1-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com>
 <1550568271-5319-4-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com>
 <2a4ce6c4-23be-3da3-02ca-e492d2dab763@arm.com>
From:   Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Message-ID: <1f82868c-2121-b158-ec27-c9f936f26ce5@arm.com>
Date:   Mon, 4 Mar 2019 16:21:18 +0530
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Hi James,

On 2/27/19 12:01 AM, James Morse wrote:
> Hi Amit,
> 
> On 19/02/2019 09:24, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
>> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>
>> When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
>> This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
>> a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
>>
>> Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
>> in the kernel and present into CPU implementation so only VHE code
>> paths are modified.
> 
>> When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
>> authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
>> disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
>> trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
>> context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
>> vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again.
> 
>> However the host key registers
>> are saved in vcpu load stage as they remain constant for each vcpu
>> schedule.
> 
> (I think we can get away with doing this later ... with the hope of doing it never!)
> 
> 
>> Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
>> authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
>> either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
>> from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
>> framework in the host.
>>
>> Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
>> be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
>> covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
>> prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
>> which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
>> supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
>> authentication to be present in a cpu.
> 
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index 2f1bb86..1bacf78 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -146,6 +146,18 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
> 
>> +static inline bool kvm_supports_ptrauth(void)
>> +{
>> +	return has_vhe() && system_supports_address_auth() &&
>> +				system_supports_generic_auth();
>> +}
> 
> Do we intend to support the implementation defined algorithm? I'd assumed not.
> 
> system_supports_address_auth() is defined as:
> | static inline bool system_supports_address_auth(void)
> | {
> | 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH) &&
> | 		(cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH) ||
> | 		cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF));
> | }
> 
> 
> So we could return true from kvm_supports_ptrauth() even if we only support the imp-def
> algorithm.
> 
> I think we should hide the imp-def ptrauth support as KVM hides all other imp-def
> features. This lets us avoid trying to migrate values that have been signed with the
> imp-def algorithm.
I suppose imp-def algorithm should not make any difference in migration 
case even if the 2 system uses different imp-def algorithm. As the LR 
PAC field generation happens at runtime so only things matters is key 
value and SP which is taken care. Also the model on which I am testing 
uses imp-def algorithm. Or am I missing something ?
> 
> I'm worried that it could include some value that we can't migrate (e.g. the SoC serial
> number). Does the ARM-ARM say this can't happen?
> 
> All I can find is D5.1.5 "Pointer authentication in AArch64 state" of DDI0487D.a which has
> this clause for the imp-def algorithm:
> | For a set of arguments passed to the function, must give the same result for all PEs
> | that a thread of execution could migrate between.
> 
> ... with KVM we've extended the scope of migration significantly.
> 
> 
> Could we check the cpus_have_const_cap() values for the two architected algorithms directly?
> 
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
>> index 6e65cad..09e061a 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h
>> @@ -153,6 +153,13 @@ bool __fpsimd_enabled(void);
>>   void activate_traps_vhe_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>>   void deactivate_traps_vhe_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>>   
>> +void __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> +			       struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt,
>> +			       struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt);
>> +void __ptrauth_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> +			      struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt,
>> +			      struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt);
> 
> 
> Why do you need the vcpu and the guest_ctxt?
> Would it be possible for these to just take the vcpu, and to pull the host context from
> the per-cpu variable?
> This would avoid any future bugs where the ctxt's are the wrong way round, taking two is
> unusual in KVM, but necessary here.
> 
> As you're calling these from asm you want the compiler to do as much of the type mangling
> as possible.
Yes it is possible. I will implement in my upcoming version.
> 
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
>> index 4e2fb87..5cac605 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
>> @@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static const char *esr_class_str[] = {
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_LS]		= "CP14 LDC/STC",
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_FP_ASIMD]		= "ASIMD",
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_CP10_ID]		= "CP10 MRC/VMRS",
>> +	[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC]		= "Pointer authentication trap",
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_CP14_64]		= "CP14 MCRR/MRRC",
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_ILL]		= "PSTATE.IL",
>>   	[ESR_ELx_EC_SVC32]		= "SVC (AArch32)",
> 
> Is this needed? Or was it just missing from the parts already merged. (should it be a
> separate patch for the arch code)
Yes you are right and looks like this is a missed patch of commit 
aa6eece8ec5095e479. I suppose this can be posted as a separate patch.
> 
> It looks like KVM only prints it from kvm_handle_unknown_ec(), which would never happen as
> arm_exit_handlers[] has an entry for ESR_ELx_EC_PAC.
yes.
> 
> Is it true that the host could never take this trap either?, as it can only be taken when
> HCR_EL2.TGE is clear.
> (breadcrumbs from the ESR_ELx definition to "Trap to EL2 of EL0 accesses to Pointer
> authentication instructions")
>
Yes most of the ptrauth instructions are treated as NOP but some 
instructions like PACGA and XPAC [0] are always enabled and may trap if 
CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH is disabled. In VHE mode this is not trapping as 
HCR_EL2.TGE is set. But in NVHE mode this is causing hang instead of 
trap if tested with HCR_EL2.API=0. Further checking on it.

[0]: DDI0487D_a_arm (page: D5-2390)

>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> index 675fdc1..b78cc15 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> @@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter)
>>   
>>   	add	x18, x0, #VCPU_CONTEXT
>>   
>> +#ifdef	CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>> +	// Prepare parameter for __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(vcpu, host, guest).
>> +	mov	x2, x18
>> +	bl	__ptrauth_switch_to_guest
>> +#endif
> 
> This calls back into C code with x18 clobbered... is that allowed?
> x18 has this weird platform-register/temporary-register behaviour, that depends on the
> compiler. The PCS[0] has a note that 'hand-coded assembler should avoid it entirely'!
Yes agree with you that x18 may get clobbered.
> 
> Can we assume that compiler generated code is using it from something, and depends on that
> value, which means we need to preserve or save/restore it when calling into C.
> 
> 
> The upshot? Could you use one of the callee saved registers instead of x18, then move it
> after your C call.
Yes using a callee register is an option.
> 
> 
>> @@ -118,6 +124,17 @@ ENTRY(__guest_exit)
>>   
>>   	get_host_ctxt	x2, x3
>>   
>> +#ifdef	CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>> +	// Prepare parameter for __ptrauth_switch_to_host(vcpu, guest, host).
>> +	// Save x0, x2 which are used later in callee saved registers.
>> +	mov	x19, x0
>> +	mov	x20, x2
>> +	sub	x0, x1, #VCPU_CONTEXT
> 
>> +	ldr	x29, [x2, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(29)]
> 
> Is this to make the stack-trace look plausible?
> 
> 
>> +	bl	__ptrauth_switch_to_host
>> +	mov	x0, x19
>> +	mov	x2, x20
>> +#endif
> 
> (ditching the host_ctxt would let you move this above get_host_ctxt and the need to
> preserve its result)
ok.
> 
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..528ee6e
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/ptrauth-sr.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
> 
>> +static __always_inline bool __ptrauth_is_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> 
> This __always_inline still looks weird! You said it might be needed to make it function
> pointer safe. If it is, could you add a comment explaining why.
> 
> (alternatives would be making it an #ifdef, disabling ptrauth for the whole file, or
> annotating this function too)
ok __noptrauth annotation may be better as some functions are already 
using it in this file.
> 
> 
>> +#define __ptrauth_save_key(regs, key)						\
>> +({										\
>> +	regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1);	\
>> +	regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1);	\
>> +})
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void __ptrauth_save_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
>> +{
>> +	__ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
>> +	__ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
>> +	__ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
>> +	__ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
>> +	__ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
>> +}
>> +
>> +#define __ptrauth_restore_key(regs, key) 					\
>> +({										\
>> +	write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1);	\
>> +	write_sysreg_s(regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1], SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1);	\
>> +})
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void __ptrauth_restore_state(struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt)
>> +{
>> +	__ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
>> +	__ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
>> +	__ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
>> +	__ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
>> +	__ptrauth_restore_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
> 
> Are writes to these registers self synchronising? I'd assume not, as they come as a pair.
> 
> I think this means we need an isb() here to ensure that when restoring the host registers
> the next host authentication attempt uses the key we wrote here? We don't need it for the
> guest, so we could put it at the end of __ptrauth_switch_to_host().
yes isb() is required.
> 
> 
>> +/**
>> + * This function changes the key so assign Pointer Authentication safe
>> + * GCC attribute if protected by it.
>> + */
> 
> ... this comment is the reminder for 'once we have host kernel ptrauth support'? could we
> add something to say that kernel support is when the attribute would be needed. Otherwise
> it reads like we're waiting for GCC support.
ok.
> 
> (I assume LLVM has a similar attribute ... is it exactly the same?)
> 
> 
>> +void __ptrauth_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> +				  struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt,
>> +				  struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt)
>> +{
> 
>> +}
> 
>> +void __ptrauth_switch_to_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> +				 struct kvm_cpu_context *guest_ctxt,
>> +				 struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>> +{
> 
>> +}
> 
> 
> Could you add NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(symbol_name) for these. This adds them to the kprobe
> blacklist as they aren't part of the __hyp_text. (and don't need to be as its VHE only).
> Without this, you can patch a software-breakpoint in here, which KVM won't handle as its
> already switched VBAR for entry to the guest.
ok.
> 
> Details in 7d82602909ed ("KVM: arm64: Forbid kprobing of the VHE world-switch code")
> 
> (... this turned up in a kernel version later than you based on ...)
> 
> 
>> +/**
>> + * kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset - resets ptrauth for vcpu schedule
>> + *
>> + * @vcpu: The VCPU pointer
>> + *
>> + * This function may be used to disable ptrauth and use it in a lazy context
>> + * via traps. However host key registers are saved here as they dont change
>> + * during host/guest switch.
>> + */
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> +	struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt;
>> +
>> +	if (kvm_supports_ptrauth()) {
>> +		kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu);
>> +		host_ctxt = vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context;
> 
>> +		__ptrauth_save_state(host_ctxt);
> 
> Could you equally do this host-save in kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap() before
> kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable()? This would avoid saving the keys if the guest never gets
> the opportunity to change them. At the moment we do it on every vcpu_load().
ok nice suggestion. It works fine in kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap().
> 
> 
> As kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset() isn't used as part of the world-switch, could we keep it
> outside the 'hyp' directory? The Makefile for that directory expects to be building the
> hyp text, so it disables KASAN, KCOV and friends.
> kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_reset() is safe for all of these, and its good for it to be covered
> by this debug infrastructure. Could you move it to guest.c?
ok.
> 
> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>> index a6c9381..12529df 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c> @@ -1045,9 +1071,10 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(struct sys_reg_desc const *r, bool raz)
>>   					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
>>   					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
>>   					 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
>> -		if (val & ptrauth_mask)
>> +		if (!kvm_supports_ptrauth()) {
>>   			kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
>> -		val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
>> +			val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
>> +		}
> 
> This means that debug message gets printed even on systems that don't support ptrauth in
> hardware. (val&ptrauth_mask) used to cut them out, now kvm_supports_ptrauth() fails if the
> static keys are false, and we end up printing this message.
> Now that KVM supports pointer-auth, I don't think the debug message is useful, can we
> remove it? (it would now mean 'you didn't ask for ptrauth to be turned on')
ok.
> 
> 
> Could we always mask out the imp-def bits?
I guess no as explained before.
> 
> 
> This patch needs to be merged together with 4 & 5 so the user-abi is as it should be. This
> means the check_present/restrictions thing needs sorting so they're ready together.
ok.

Thanks,
Amit D>
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> James
> 
> 
> [0] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0055b/IHI0055B_aapcs64.pdf
>