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Date:   Mon, 4 Mar 2019 18:01:54 +0800
From:   Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc:     pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
        yu-cheng.yu@intel.com, Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] KVM:CPUID: Add CPUID support for Guest CET
Message-ID: <20190304100154.GA3617@local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com>
References: <20190225132716.6982-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
 <20190225132716.6982-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
 <20190304184753.GD17120@linux.intel.com>
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On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 10:47:53AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 09:27:11PM +0800, Yang Weijiang wrote:
> > Guest CET SHSTK and IBT capability are reported via
> > CPUID.(EAX=7, ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] and EDX[bit 20] respectively.
> > Guest user mode and supervisor mode xsaves component size
> > is reported via CPUID.(EAX=0xD, ECX=1):ECX[bit 11] and ECX[bit 12]
> > respectively.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> >  arch/x86/kvm/x86.h   |  4 +++
> >  2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > index cb1aece25b17..5e05756cc6db 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
> > @@ -65,6 +65,16 @@ u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void)
> >  	return xcr0;
> >  }
> >  
> > +u64 kvm_supported_xss(void)
> > +{
> > +	u64 xss;
> > +
> > +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_XSS, xss);
> 
> Honest question as I haven't thought through the flows: do we actually
> need to restrict XSS based on what's enabled in the host?  This
> conflicts with your other statements that CET features can be enabled
> independent of host support.
> 
> And if we do incorporate the host status, the value should be read once
> and cached unless we're expecting the host value to change dynamically,
> e.g. see host_efer.
> 
> > +	xss &= KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS;
> > +	return xss;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvm_supported_xss);
> > +
> >  #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x)
> >  
> >  /* For scattered features from cpufeatures.h; we currently expose none */
> > @@ -323,6 +333,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >  				 u32 index, int *nent, int maxnent)
> >  {
> >  	int r;
> > +	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> >  	unsigned f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0;
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> >  	unsigned f_gbpages = (kvm_x86_ops->get_lpage_level() == PT_PDPE_LEVEL)
> > @@ -503,6 +514,20 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >  			 * if the host doesn't support it.
> >  			 */
> >  			entry->edx |= F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
> > +
> > +			/*
> > +			 * Guest OS CET enabling is designed independent to
> > +			 * host enabling, it only has dependency on Host HW
> > +			 * capability, if it has, report CET support to
> > +			 * Guest.
> > +			 */
> > +			cpuid_count(7, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> > +			if (ecx & F(SHSTK))
> > +				entry->ecx |= F(SHSTK);
> > +
> > +			if (edx & F(IBT))
> > +				entry->edx |= F(IBT);
> > +
> >  		} else {
> >  			entry->ebx = 0;
> >  			entry->ecx = 0;
> > @@ -564,14 +589,17 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >  	}
> >  	case 0xd: {
> >  		int idx, i;
> > -		u64 supported = kvm_supported_xcr0();
> > +		u64 u_supported = kvm_supported_xcr0();
> > +		u64 s_supported = kvm_supported_xss();
> > +		u64 supported;
> > +		int compacted;
> >  
> > -		entry->eax &= supported;
> > -		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, false);
> > +		entry->eax &= u_supported;
> > +		entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(u_supported, false);
> >  		entry->ecx = entry->ebx;
> > -		entry->edx &= supported >> 32;
> > +		entry->edx &= u_supported >> 32;
> >  		entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
> > -		if (!supported)
> > +		if (!u_supported && !s_supported)
> >  			break;
> >  
> >  		for (idx = 1, i = 1; idx < 64; ++idx) {
> > @@ -583,19 +611,23 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >  			if (idx == 1) {
> >  				entry[i].eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features;
> >  				cpuid_mask(&entry[i].eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX);
> > -				entry[i].ebx = 0;
> > -				if (entry[i].eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC)))
> > -					entry[i].ebx =
> > -						xstate_required_size(supported,
> > -								     true);
> > +				supported = u_supported | s_supported;
> > +				compacted = entry[i].eax &
> > +					(F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC));
> > +				entry[i].ebx = xstate_required_size(supported,
> > +								    compacted);
> > +				entry[i].ecx &= s_supported;
> > +				entry[i].edx = 0;
> >  			} else {
> > +				supported = (entry[i].ecx & 1) ? s_supported :
> > +								 u_supported;
> >  				if (entry[i].eax == 0 || !(supported & mask))
> >  					continue;
> > -				if (WARN_ON_ONCE(entry[i].ecx & 1))
> > -					continue;
> > +				entry[i].ecx &= 1;
> > +				entry[i].edx = 0;
> > +				if (entry[i].ecx)
> > +					entry[i].ebx = 0;
> >  			}
> > -			entry[i].ecx = 0;
> > -			entry[i].edx = 0;
> >  			entry[i].flags |=
> >  			       KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
> >  			++*nent;
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > index 224cd0a47568..c61da41c3c5c 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> > @@ -283,6 +283,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr2,
> >  				| XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS \
> >  				| XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \
> >  				| XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU)
> > +
> > +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS	(XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER \
> > +				| XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_KERNEL)
> 
> I don't think these definitions are correct, the spec I have lists them
> as CET_U and CET_S, i.e. they aren't specific to SHSTK.  Did these names
> get inherited from the kernel enabling patches?
>
Yes, exactly, I'll notify kernel developer of the issue.
> > +
> >  extern u64 host_xcr0;
> >  
> >  extern u64 kvm_supported_xcr0(void);
> > -- 
> > 2.17.1
> >