Received: by 2002:ac0:aed5:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id t21csp5297506imb; Thu, 7 Mar 2019 12:16:45 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzwP9NGCXvAiwS5/BIIVjE96aEGgitP9xI0yUV8ZJoIcViW78WBOLznuyH4+nGYDmRjyNhF X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:8217:: with SMTP id x23mr14977441pln.332.1551989805600; Thu, 07 Mar 2019 12:16:45 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1551989805; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=VIizq/zVLO3EfrX+X7ub5ZIpmKexPjy5xbgKAMhr5dPisMZbqH+ZMxHjCKlChC2dmV IXaYb5rGt0PeKjLz7ZZwgLDB6VQYGcnW7LEitOWjSzDmwxw/c1Q2RZvU+slcc1hiV10u /z0E+SyWrnhF3gXD8EDsedvi//4JyrVwl0+dEqpKLpJ93Bh2AUor1qGUDZpdS0hIaIcZ GfFA6E67vNjT1+7TYZ9yCDEUqEpXkc4u897Fn6kBTmuTXgYi/PztmZvNVOuU0o1wur3O KvB+Cqgvu2TelPJE0J2w58SYknPkj9TaefFZVrcHSaAavuAHu+HG8Sjp6XajeVd+8nVT x7Vg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding :content-language:in-reply-to:mime-version:user-agent:date :message-id:from:references:cc:to:subject; bh=PXpC5jnwoci9zuSRvz2LY6hUwKEzYFJTDzKPiuEe5cU=; b=r2IRiIpW4DRSdPYuseYKaaxN8wekZ+TVAPL9uAG+DwIJUhCylcziBlt8RjZo0kf8Bj Jw2/uBy7OGGRT+k1mJbHf5YYQRmVTq4r/vIlchBrUOGM3Hhx5wRpKfLNA0/32iNmUi7W c2MU86mwseGZayRJE6gpbzBU9SeSQjCUBVDVWisPPCi+NYZIqq4spekDv+Iu0H5tBUkF +t2EH6/rFMH3Hd+W7p9bOS4IV0emQ0zECROnGBjFa21Bh2s8b1t1+gBWqm06Lm3Kc0Py ou0Km7Tpyyht1M4ti7RsbvGoREvkC2GJp9Zch1DK/IInlLcBKnrFne6mX7RiHY4shIBE 3nQA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=virtuozzo.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b17si4868582pfm.57.2019.03.07.12.16.29; Thu, 07 Mar 2019 12:16:45 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=virtuozzo.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726254AbfCGUQC (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:16:02 -0500 Received: from relay.sw.ru ([185.231.240.75]:57738 "EHLO relay.sw.ru" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726166AbfCGUQB (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Mar 2019 15:16:01 -0500 Received: from [192.168.15.234] by relay.sw.ru with esmtp (Exim 4.91) (envelope-from ) id 1h1zQg-0003at-Th; Thu, 07 Mar 2019 23:15:47 +0300 Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/20] objtool: Add UACCESS validation To: Peter Zijlstra , Linus Torvalds Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Peter Anvin , Julien Thierry , Will Deacon , Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar , Catalin Marinas , James Morse , valentin.schneider@arm.com, Brian Gerst , Josh Poimboeuf , Andrew Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Denys Vlasenko , Linux List Kernel Mailing , Dmitry Vyukov , Steven Rostedt References: <20190307114511.870090179@infradead.org> <20190307115200.697533978@infradead.org> <20190307174135.GJ32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> From: Andrey Ryabinin Message-ID: <6a4875bd-2b22-91e4-cbe2-b01c12786a1b@virtuozzo.com> Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 23:15:42 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.5.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190307174135.GJ32477@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 3/7/19 8:41 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 08:33:26AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 3:52 AM Peter Zijlstra wrote: >>> >>> XXX: are we sure we want __memset marked AC-safe? >> >> It's certainly one of the safer functions to call with AC set, but it >> sounds wrong anyway. It's not like it's likely to leak kernel data >> (most memset's are with 0, and even the non-zero ones I can't imagine >> are sensitive - more like poison values etc). >> >> What's the call site that made you go "just add __memset() to the list"? > > __asan_{,un}poinson_stack_memory() These two can be called only with CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=y which was removed very recently, so it should be safe to delete these functions. > kasan_{,un}poison_shadow() > __memset() > >