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Date:   Thu, 7 Mar 2019 21:33:18 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>, valentin.schneider@arm.com,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/20] objtool: Add UACCESS validation
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On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 11:15:42PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> 
> 
> On 3/7/19 8:41 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 08:33:26AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 3:52 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> XXX: are we sure we want __memset marked AC-safe?
> >>
> >> It's certainly one of the safer functions to call with AC set, but it
> >> sounds wrong anyway. It's not like it's likely to leak kernel data
> >> (most memset's are with 0, and even the non-zero ones I can't imagine
> >> are sensitive - more like poison values etc).
> >>
> >> What's the call site that made you go "just add __memset() to the list"?
> > 
> > __asan_{,un}poinson_stack_memory()
> 
> These two can be called only with CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA=y which 
> was removed very recently, so it should be safe to delete these functions.

Ooh shiny. Clearly my tree still has them; what commit do I need to look
for?