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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc:     linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
        "Bruno E . O . Meneguele" <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 07 Mar 2019 17:41:38 -0500
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On Thu, 2019-03-07 at 14:36 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 2:34 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 2019-03-07 at 14:27 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 4:18 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > -       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> > > > +       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > > > +               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
> > > > +                       set_module_sig_enforced();
> > > >                 return sb_arch_rules;
> > >
> > > Linus previously pushed back on having the lockdown features
> > > automatically enabled on secure boot systems. Why are we doing the
> > > same in IMA?
> >
> > IMA-appraisal is extending the "secure boot" concept to the running
> > system.
> 
> Right, but how is this different to what Linus was objecting to?

Both Andy Lutomirski and Linus objected to limiting the "lockdown"
patch set to secure boot enabled systems.

Mimi