Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S262993AbUCSNkl (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Mar 2004 08:40:41 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S262992AbUCSNkl (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Mar 2004 08:40:41 -0500 Received: from MAIL.13thfloor.at ([212.16.62.51]:28625 "EHLO mail.13thfloor.at") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S262993AbUCSNkb (ORCPT ); Fri, 19 Mar 2004 08:40:31 -0500 Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 14:40:28 +0100 From: Herbert Poetzl To: viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk Cc: Andrew Morton , torvalds@osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] Bind Mount Extensions 0.04.1 3/5 Message-ID: <20040319134028.GA5297@MAIL.13thfloor.at> Mail-Followup-To: viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk, Andrew Morton , torvalds@osdl.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20040315035506.GB30948@MAIL.13thfloor.at> <20040314201457.23fdb96e.akpm@osdl.org> <20040315042541.GA31412@MAIL.13thfloor.at> <20040314203427.27857fd9.akpm@osdl.org> <20040315075814.GE31818@MAIL.13thfloor.at> <20040318122645.GJ31500@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk> <20040319025236.GC31040@MAIL.13thfloor.at> <20040319111117.GP31500@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20040319111117.GP31500@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4469 Lines: 131 On Fri, Mar 19, 2004 at 11:11:17AM +0000, viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk wrote: > On Fri, Mar 19, 2004 at 03:52:36AM +0100, Herbert Poetzl wrote: > > @@ -846,6 +846,16 @@ int presto_permission(struct inode *inod > > > > cache = presto_get_cache(inode); > > > > + /* Nobody gets write access to a read-only fs */ > > + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && > > + (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode)) && > > + (IS_RDONLY(inode) || (nd && MNT_IS_RDONLY(nd->mnt)))) > > + return -EROFS; > > + > > + /* Nobody gets write access to an immutable file */ > > + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) > > + return -EACCES; > > + > > That is gratitious, since the only way presto_setattr() > is ever called is as ->permission(). you mean presto_permission(), and yes, so that can be removed > > --- linux-2.6.5-rc1-bk3-bme0.04.2-atime/fs/jfs/acl.c 2004-03-11 03:55:21.000000000 +0100 > > +++ linux-2.6.5-rc1-bk3-bme0.04.2-permission/fs/jfs/acl.c 2004-03-19 03:18:12.000000000 +0100 > > @@ -132,21 +132,6 @@ int jfs_permission(struct inode * inode, > > umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; > > struct jfs_inode_info *ji = JFS_IP(inode); > > > > - if (mask & MAY_WRITE) { > > - /* > > ... and that is broken, since jfs_permission() can be called directly. incomplete, not broken ... -? jfs_permission() ?-? can_get_xattr() ? '-? __jfs_getxattr() ? ?-? jfs_get_acl() ? ? ?-? jfs_acl_chmod() ? ? ? '-? jfs_setattr() ? ? ? ? ? ?-? jfs_init_acl() ? ? ? ?-? jfs_create() ? ? ? ?-? jfs_mkdir() ? ? ? ?-? jfs_mknod() ? ? ? '-? jfs_symlink() ? ? ? ? ? '-= jfs_permission() ? ? ? '-? jfs_getxattr() ? '-? can_set_xattr() '-? __jfs_setxattr() ?-? jfs_removexattr() ?-? jfs_set_acl() ? ?-= jfs_acl_chmod() ? '-= jfs_init_acl() ? '-? jfs_setxattr() the xattr struff needs attention anyway, and many of the functions calling jfs_permission() directly or indirectly will have the check at a higher layer ... > FWIW, I would start with > 1) split out simple_permission() - vfs_permission() sans the > r/o checks; vfs_permission() would call it and all in-tree calls of > vfs_permission() would get expanded. -? vfs_permission() ?-? hfs_permission() ?-? hfsplus_permission() ?-? nfs_permission() ?-* permission() ?-? presto_permission() '-? proc_permission() please elaborate ... > 2) prove that all instances of ->permission() honour r/o checks. > Fix the broken ones (and yes, we do have them - e.g. hfs_permission() > or bogus return values in proc_permission()), after we'd shown that > it's safe. Note that it's not obvious - e.g. anything around ACLs or > XFS ioctls is not just fscking ugly - it's brittle as hell and > will require very careful treatment. okay, but why not do it in permission(), and make the few callers of vfs_permission use that one instead? except for jfs_permission() and nfsd_permission() (which is hell enough) there are no direct calls of *_permission() ... > 3) once that is done, put r/o checks into the beginning of > permission(9) hmm, obviously you didn't read the patch at all, as that is exactly what I did, so please have a look at it ... > 4) for all instances of ->permission(), move r/o checks in > the places that call that instance directly. Remove them from method > itself. > > And yes, #2 will hurt. Badly. I don't see why, please enlighten me ... > BTW, IS_RDONLY() part of that stuff will really hit the fan when you start > touching the FPOS in fs/ext2/xattr.c and around it. Have fun... > > Note that it's not enough to bring relevant vfsmount to every caller of > IS_RDONLY() - if we are calling it to make sure that fs is not r/o, > we _really_ want to make sure that it doesn't get remounted r/o just as > IS_RDONLY() returns. And yes, there are real bugs in that area. hmm, well but how would moving the ro checks around or adding them for the vfs mounts influence that? I agree that this _is_ an issue but why should this _not_ happen with mount -o remount,ro /xy ? best, Herbert - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/