Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Wed, 13 Mar 2019 09:44:33 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To:     Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc:     Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
        Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
        overlayfs <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Lawrence <paullawrence@google.com>
Subject: Re: overlayfs vs. fscrypt
Message-ID: <20190313164432.GE703@sol.localdomain>
References: <4603533.ZIfxmiEf7K@blindfold>
 <1854703.ve7plDhYWt@blindfold>
 <CAJfpegtgfuAkgv26QH6Ht25OeMiev-QvEf7ror4KAbud7FADgg@mail.gmail.com>
 <4066872.KGdO14EQMx@blindfold>
 <CAOQ4uxhqQKzriL0An4Tvzc1E_LffL-z9q1otOW_RdD1ZdKWP3Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <20190313151633.GA672@mit.edu>
 <20190313160616.GR2217@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20190313160616.GR2217@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.3 (2019-02-01)
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 04:06:16PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 11:16:33AM -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> > Actually, the original use was for ChromeOS, but the primary
> > assumption is that keying is per user (or profile), and that users are
> > mutually distrustful.  So when Alice logs out of the system, her keys
> > will be invalidated and removed from the kernel.  We can (and do) try
> > to flush cache entries via "echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches" on
> > logout.  However, this does not guarantee that all dcache entries will
> > be removed --- a dcache entry can be pinned due to an open file, a
> > process's current working directory, a bind mount, etc.
> > 
> > The other issue is negative dentries; if you try open a file in an
> > encrypted file, the file system won't even *know* whether or not a
> > file exists, since the directory entries are encrypted; hence, there
> > may be some negative dentries that need to be invalidated.
> > 
> > So a fundamental assumption with fscrypt is that keys will be added
> > and removed, and that when this happens, dentries will need to be
> > invalidated.  This is going to surprise overlayfs, so if overlayfs is
> > going to support fscrypt it *has* to be aware of the fact that this
> > can happen.  It's not even clear what the proper security semantics
> > should be; *especially* if the upper and lower directories aren't
> > similarly protected using the same fscrypt encryption key.  Suppose
> > the lower directory is encrypted, and the upper is not.  Now on a copy
> > up operation, the previously encrypted file, which might contain
> > credit card numbers, medical records, or other things that would cause
> > a GDPR regulator to have a freak out attack, would *poof* become
> > decrypted.
> 
> Just to make sure - you do realize that ban on multiple dentries refering
> to the same directory inode is *NOT* conditional upon those dentries being
> hashed, right?

Isn't this handled by d_splice_alias() already, by moving the old dentry to the
new name?

- Eric