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From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 20 Mar 2019 11:58:57 -0700
Message-ID: <CALCETrXO=V=+qEdLDVPf8eCgLZiB9bOTrUfe0V-U-tUZoeoRDA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: pidfd design
To:     Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc:     Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
        Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>,
        Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        =?UTF-8?B?QXJ2ZSBIasO4bm5ldsOlZw==?= <arve@android.com>,
        Todd Kjos <tkjos@android.com>,
        Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "open list:ANDROID DRIVERS" <devel@driverdev.osuosl.org>,
        linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@android.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 11:52 AM Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> wrote:
>
> You're misunderstanding. Again, I said in my previous mails it should
> accept pidfds optionally as arguments, yes. But I don't want it to
> return the status fds that you previously wanted pidfd_wait() to return.
> I really want to see Joel's pidfd_wait() patchset and have more people
> review the actual code.

Just to make sure that no one is forgetting a material security consideration:

$ ls /proc/self
attr             exe        mountinfo      projid_map    status
autogroup        fd         mounts         root          syscall
auxv             fdinfo     mountstats     sched         task
cgroup           gid_map    net            schedstat     timers
clear_refs       io         ns             sessionid     timerslack_ns
cmdline          latency    numa_maps      setgroups     uid_map
comm             limits     oom_adj        smaps         wchan
coredump_filter  loginuid   oom_score      smaps_rollup
cpuset           map_files  oom_score_adj  stack
cwd              maps       pagemap        stat
environ          mem        personality    statm

A bunch of this stuff makes sense to make accessible through a syscall
interface that we expect to be used even in sandboxes.  But a bunch of
it does not.  For example, *_map, mounts, mountstats, and net are all
namespace-wide things that certain policies expect to be unavailable.
stack, for example, is a potential attack surface.  Etc.

As it stands, if you create a fresh userns and mountns and try to
mount /proc, there are some really awful and hideous rules that are
checked for security reasons.  All these new APIs either need to
return something more restrictive than a proc dirfd or they need to
follow the same rules.  And I'm afraid that the latter may be a
nonstarter if you expect these APIs to be used in libraries.

Yes, this is unfortunate, but it is indeed the current situation.  I
suppose that we could return magic restricted dirfds, or we could
return things that aren't dirfds and all and have some API that gives
you the dirfd associated with a procfd but only if you can see
/proc/PID.

--Andy