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From:   "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
        Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] efi: print appropriate status message when loading certificates
Date:   Fri, 22 Mar 2019 18:33:50 +0800
Message-Id: <20190322103350.27764-2-jlee@suse.com>
In-Reply-To: <20190322103350.27764-1-jlee@suse.com>
References: <20190322103350.27764-1-jlee@suse.com>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

When loading certificates list from UEFI variable, the original error
message direct shows the efi status code from UEFI firmware. It looks
ugly:

[    2.335031] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    2.335032] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT
[    2.339985] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    2.339987] Couldn't get UEFI dbx list

So, this patch shows the status string instead of status code.

On the other hand, the error message of EFI_NOT_FOUND
(0x800000000000000e) doesn't need to be exposed because kernel
already prints "Couldn't get UEFI..." message. This patch also
filtered out it.

Link: https://forums.opensuse.org/showthread.php/535324-MODSIGN-Couldn-t-get-UEFI-db-list?p=2897516#post2897516
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
---
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 81b19c52832b..fe261166621f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
 
 	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb);
 	if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
-		pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status);
+		if (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+			pr_err("Couldn't get size: %s\n",
+				efi_status_to_str(status));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -59,7 +61,8 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid,
 	status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
 		kfree(db);
-		pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status);
+		pr_err("Error reading db var: %s\n",
+			efi_status_to_str(status));
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-- 
2.16.4