Received: by 2002:ac0:bc90:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id a16csp603466img; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 05:00:39 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxJKsJEFX13duN5aATQKzpcd0RVm+/aWmy2y7CTYO6vBBdEAQRGTc9+o1KLtH2zi7Fep9Sl X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:2a89:: with SMTP id j9mr8875341plb.272.1553256039565; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 05:00:39 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1553256039; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=eCNpZEioWRyMfDEHRWPllCJ8zLYjg/ZVyIbI/M2gq+hGQ0KU5ZOotL80J98snWZ35K lQKKB6Lg469F8m+f/QWXtaAPfC8RCHzaG9HJ9pEzfw0MlNbkZ78z7TAY+MX4kPMWAjtL M0k4zG5Sb2srLWH7hBZQUEYI5fJ3lKRc1y+YC5rsL//qlfkmiOHzWK33zIH+cdZ8KLpN 24rFEyfPqAfLq9a774WHRl1qTb+GLddlfmDImZRWbj/DqOzg06FEtsljsQE/0LKkgVpx d4JSfuWiRLmg65dlXWx7cJVkCigRvWwl1f/0FSJQmclPvZ0lb2f3lZbYK7Bo/2sn7enA 7ySA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=1gqk/pCf1WSPhAguk+lt4/qeKt639DNl1TMbf49se8g=; b=vOx+uLomVOgKAcHPS/2HpTXwNUkHeS/bgp0NB4cruGFnI9m4FWfzD4g/LcUk1cx6dm Z1HDL7VSS0P6i2WRH8R/WQqa7hR1/g3OymRRA7FfdSHhg/NOO4RdKWXL3n8IPovmn/yB 9rSxVKX8QLD9JxTfyNzgaYxVKgkagoOEB6/yXU8LXplYqHq+rDQsY0ooK7wKgrX+ErmI Gh/Sd75zEOTIX1hdEvJBGqFxpZIs+mcbHzM1ex99nWg1wHIyWR9j1NMLHc21aiBVnN2K TbcCbmW2Oqd1BddbukJFopg0tCjc/wLBvAiKYpsjCWCBj9zLpOfsYMH8i0Woqb1LDcLo 3TDQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=BhjWaKEx; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b13si5185621pgl.331.2019.03.22.05.00.24; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 05:00:39 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=BhjWaKEx; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732861AbfCVL7t (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 22 Mar 2019 07:59:49 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:36776 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2388031AbfCVL7q (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Mar 2019 07:59:46 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8349320830; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 11:59:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1553255985; bh=amF1PAGqz+JGQScY9muPID0gUz+J3J3kBRUy0Zhehcc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=BhjWaKExH1KDCScfhLC2CZzrr6EDKavz1jr1erUdhqJELc89goR0ns2v6X1tZUY50 HdYSeIB9X2QbPAcjH2gJiKoBNlU5D2Sa/levXLvgmwZFzSBKtiGZ1YkvahXOWyuel1 zz4VqS3JwB6s2kVcuhAIsECmGvFLmHTJK92pXIkY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet , Sean Tranchetti , Steffen Klassert , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 074/280] af_key: unconditionally clone on broadcast Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:13:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20190322111310.488855456@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190322111306.356185024@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190322111306.356185024@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ [ Upstream commit fc2d5cfdcfe2ab76b263d91429caa22451123085 ] Attempting to avoid cloning the skb when broadcasting by inflating the refcount with sock_hold/sock_put while under RCU lock is dangerous and violates RCU principles. It leads to subtle race conditions when attempting to free the SKB, as we may reference sockets that have already been freed by the stack. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6c4b [006b6b6b6b6b6c4b] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP task: fffffff78f65b380 task.stack: ffffff8049a88000 pc : sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c lr : skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc Process repro (pid: 7117, stack limit = 0xffffff8049a88000) Call trace: sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc skb_release_all+0x1c/0x38 __kfree_skb+0x1c/0x30 kfree_skb+0xd0/0xf4 pfkey_broadcast+0x14c/0x18c pfkey_sendmsg+0x1d8/0x408 sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8 __sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4 SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/key/af_key.c | 40 +++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 9d61266526e7..7da629d59717 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -196,30 +196,22 @@ static int pfkey_release(struct socket *sock) return 0; } -static int pfkey_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff **skb2, - gfp_t allocation, struct sock *sk) +static int pfkey_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, + struct sock *sk) { int err = -ENOBUFS; - sock_hold(sk); - if (*skb2 == NULL) { - if (refcount_read(&skb->users) != 1) { - *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, allocation); - } else { - *skb2 = skb; - refcount_inc(&skb->users); - } - } - if (*skb2 != NULL) { - if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) { - skb_set_owner_r(*skb2, sk); - skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, *skb2); - sk->sk_data_ready(sk); - *skb2 = NULL; - err = 0; - } + if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf) + return err; + + skb = skb_clone(skb, allocation); + + if (skb) { + skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk); + skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb); + sk->sk_data_ready(sk); + err = 0; } - sock_put(sk); return err; } @@ -234,7 +226,6 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, { struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id); struct sock *sk; - struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL; int err = -ESRCH; /* XXX Do we need something like netlink_overrun? I think @@ -253,7 +244,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, * socket. */ if (pfk->promisc) - pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); + pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); /* the exact target will be processed later */ if (sk == one_sk) @@ -268,7 +259,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, continue; } - err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); + err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, sk); /* Error is cleared after successful sending to at least one * registered KM */ @@ -278,9 +269,8 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation, rcu_read_unlock(); if (one_sk != NULL) - err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, one_sk); + err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, allocation, one_sk); - kfree_skb(skb2); kfree_skb(skb); return err; } -- 2.19.1