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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x9si6465096pfm.59.2019.03.22.05.13.35; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 05:13:50 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=oKIn5Cpw; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389422AbfCVMND (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 22 Mar 2019 08:13:03 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51206 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389705AbfCVMNA (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Mar 2019 08:13:00 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A188D20830; Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:12:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1553256779; bh=jrERDC1H6bRlqkPZ8qSqDVQDVFktS7UjTWg/xT4WdYQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=oKIn5CpwkAsAfzQx5hJOmWBykehSY9tJlwQ4mUuWUdPej/QVRnb9IXzcsBnBBOfNY SkZWRpHAOVRfF6s0SdB9kvdq1WGYGlMGM4ilx+C118B8Soh/k19qelew2iZ3lpGuut 8Q6vA3pjlKWlY+qtmeRLVkmizosZBzZPnkSYTtkw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, Al Viro Subject: [PATCH 5.0 035/238] fix cgroup_do_mount() handling of failure exits Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:14:14 +0100 Message-Id: <20190322111300.410180703@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190322111258.383569278@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190322111258.383569278@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 5.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Al Viro commit 399504e21a10be16dd1408ba0147367d9d82a10c upstream. same story as with last May fixes in sysfs (7b745a4e4051 "unfuck sysfs_mount()"); new_sb is left uninitialized in case of early errors in kernfs_mount_ns() and papering over it by treating any error from kernfs_mount_ns() as equivalent to !new_ns ends up conflating the cases when objects had never been transferred to a superblock with ones when that has happened and resulting new superblock had been dropped. Easily fixed (same way as in sysfs case). Additionally, there's a superblock leak on kernfs_node_dentry() failure *and* a dentry leak inside kernfs_node_dentry() itself - the latter on probably impossible errors, but the former not impossible to trigger (as the matter of fact, injecting allocation failures at that point *does* trigger it). Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/kernfs/mount.c | 8 ++++++-- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/fs/kernfs/mount.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/mount.c @@ -196,8 +196,10 @@ struct dentry *kernfs_node_dentry(struct return dentry; knparent = find_next_ancestor(kn, NULL); - if (WARN_ON(!knparent)) + if (WARN_ON(!knparent)) { + dput(dentry); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } do { struct dentry *dtmp; @@ -206,8 +208,10 @@ struct dentry *kernfs_node_dentry(struct if (kn == knparent) return dentry; kntmp = find_next_ancestor(kn, knparent); - if (WARN_ON(!kntmp)) + if (WARN_ON(!kntmp)) { + dput(dentry); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } dtmp = lookup_one_len_unlocked(kntmp->name, dentry, strlen(kntmp->name)); dput(dentry); --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fi struct cgroup_namespace *ns) { struct dentry *dentry; - bool new_sb; + bool new_sb = false; dentry = kernfs_mount(fs_type, flags, root->kf_root, magic, &new_sb); @@ -2043,6 +2043,7 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fi */ if (!IS_ERR(dentry) && ns != &init_cgroup_ns) { struct dentry *nsdentry; + struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb; struct cgroup *cgrp; mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); @@ -2053,12 +2054,14 @@ struct dentry *cgroup_do_mount(struct fi spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock); mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); - nsdentry = kernfs_node_dentry(cgrp->kn, dentry->d_sb); + nsdentry = kernfs_node_dentry(cgrp->kn, sb); dput(dentry); + if (IS_ERR(nsdentry)) + deactivate_locked_super(sb); dentry = nsdentry; } - if (IS_ERR(dentry) || !new_sb) + if (!new_sb) cgroup_put(&root->cgrp); return dentry;