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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:34:09 -0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06cxnps4074.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x2QFY8br47710310 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:34:08 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3460A4C05A; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:34:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EA774C04A; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:34:07 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.109.36]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 26 Mar 2019 15:34:06 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down From: Mimi Zohar To: Matthew Garrett , jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, Matthew Garrett , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 11:33:55 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-28-matthewgarrett@google.com> References: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> <20190325220954.29054-28-matthewgarrett@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19032615-0012-0000-0000-000003075A46 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19032615-0013-0000-0000-0000213E8387 Message-Id: <1553614435.4115.19.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-03-26_11:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1903260108 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2019-03-25 at 15:09 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. > For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating > a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those > platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to > determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, > and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. > This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set > in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > Cc: Mimi Zohar > Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin > Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mimi Zohar > --- > include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ > kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 +++- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > index b5e16b8c50b7..05921227d700 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > @@ -127,4 +127,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, > return 0; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ > + > +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) > +extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func); > +#else > +static inline bool ima_appraise_kexec_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) > +{ > + return false; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ > #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > index 0cfe4f6f7f85..8ffa4b75c620 100644 > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > @@ -240,7 +240,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > > ret = 0; > > - if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) { > + /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec > + * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked > + * down. > + */ > + if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) && > + kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) { > ret = -EPERM; > goto out; > } > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index cc12f3449a72..fe03cc6f1ca4 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { > u64 count; > }; > > +extern const int read_idmap[]; > + > #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC > void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); > #else > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 4ffac4f5c647..106f06dee9d1 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > return 0; > } > > -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, > [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, > [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index 122797023bdb..f8f1cdb74a4f 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -1341,3 +1341,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) > return 0; > } > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ > + > +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) > +/* > + * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using > + * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel > + * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply > + * loading additional keys. > + */ > +bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) > +{ > + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; > + bool found = false; > + enum ima_hooks func; > + > + if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) > + return false; > + > + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; > + > + rcu_read_lock(); > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { > + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) > + continue; > + > + /* > + * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it > + * match the func we're looking for > + */ > + if (entry->func && entry->func != func) > + continue; > + > + /* > + * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA > + * hash. > + */ > + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) > + found = true; > + > + /* > + * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it > + * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does > + * won't override it, so would be a false positive. > + */ > + break; > + } > + > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return found; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */